CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Panckridge, J.
G.D. Ritchson - Appellant
Versus
W.L.D. Ritchson - Respondent
Decided On : 08-12-1937
Divorce Act - Judicial Separation - Section 37 - Summary of Acts and Sections: Section 37, Divorce Act - The court discussed the provisions of Section 37 of the Divorce Act, which allows the High Court to order the husband to secure a gross sum or annual income for the wife upon obtaining a decree of judicial separation. The court also referred to the Supreme Court of Judicature Consolidation Act 1925 and the judgment of Shearn v. Shearn (1931) LRP 1 for guidance. The court emphasized the limitations on the powers of the court to make such orders and the distinction between securing a sum and making a payment order. The court concluded that it had no power to direct the husband to perform a payment order to be secured.
Fact of the Case:
The wife obtained a decree of judicial separation and an order for maintenance from her husband. Subsequently, the husband applied for leave out of India, leading to a dispute regarding the security of the alimony payments.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that it had no power to make the order it previously issued and considered vacating the order. The court also held the husband responsible for the costs of the application.
Issues: The main issue was the court's jurisdiction to make an order regarding the security of alimony payments after the husband's application for leave out of India.
Ratio Decidendi: The court determined that it had no power to direct the husband to perform a payment order to be secured and considered vacating the order based on its discretion.
Final Decision: The court vacated the order issued on 5th July, except as regards costs, and directed the husband to pay the costs of the application.
ORDER
Panckridge, J. - This application comes before me in the following circumstances : On 26th June 1933, the wife who is the petitioner in the proceedings obtained a decree of judicial separation on account of her husband's adultery. At the time the decree was made, the learned Judge who heard the petition made an order clearly under the provisions of Section 37, Divorce Act, that the husband should pay his wife a monthly sum of Rs. 100 for her maintenance. The husband has apparently regularly carried out the order and made payments punctually. The husband's occupation is that of a permanent way inspector on the East Indian Railway. He is domiciled in India and in the early part; of this year he applied for leave out of India, and his application was granted. On 5th April 1937 the wife having come to know of the application for and sanction of the husband's leave, took out a notice of motion, asking that the alimony of Rs. 100' a month payable under the order of 26th June 1933 should be secured in such manner: as the Court thought proper. There was also a prayer that the husband: should be restrained from withdrawing his provident fund from the Railway. On 7th April 1937, the husband's bankers, Messrs. Thos. Cook & Sons, wrote a letter informing the wife that they had been instructed to pay her Rs. 100 a month during the husband's absence.
2. The husband sailed for England on 8th April 1937 having instructed his solicitors to oppose the application for security. The application was adjourned from time to time and finally it was disposed of by me on 5th July 1937 when I directed that the husband should furnish security for the alimony payable under the order of 26th June 1933, to the satisfaction of the Registrar by 15th November 1937. I have no clear recollection of the points urged on the husband's behalf of the application, but as far as I can remember no point of law-was taken, but it was pointed out that the husband had regularly paid alimony since the date of the order, and an affidavit was put in when it was stated on oath that he intended to continue to pay, and that his purpose was to return to India at the conclusion of his leave and resume his employment. He returned to India in the first week of November and on 9th November 1937 he took out a notice of motion. The notice is in the following form:
3. That the order dated 5th July 1937, so far as it relates to the furnishing of security by the applicant be set aside on his undertaking to pay alimony month by month regularly, and that the applicant be exempted from furnishing security.
4. The order of 5th July 1937 has not been drawn up or filed. The point on the merits taken by Mr. Clough on behalf of the husband is that the Court had no jurisdiction to make an order of the nature I made on 5th July. I have read Section 37, Divorce Act, and it cannot be suggested that there is any other statutory enactment under which the order could be made, and I have come to the conclusion that Mr. Clough's contention is correct. The provisions of the Divorce Act and those of the Supreme Court of Judicature Consolidation Act 1925, in which the English statute law as regards matrimonial matters is now to be found are not in identical terms : but nonetheless I have been able to derive considerable assistance from the judgment of Hill J., in Shearn v. Shearn (1931) LRP 1.
5. u/s 37, Divorce Act, the High Court may, if it thinks fit inter alia, on any decree of judicial separation obtained by the wife, order that the husband shall, to the satisfaction of the Court, secure to the wife such gross sum of money or such annual sum of money for any term not exceeding her own life as having regard to her fortune (if any) to the ability of the husband and to the conduct of the parties, it thinks reasonable, and for that purpose may cause a proper instrument to be executed by all necessary parties. The) power to make any order on the husband to secure a gross sum or annual income for the wife can
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