1929 Supreme(Cal) 162
CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Mukerji, J., Graham, J., Buckland, J.
Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs - Appellant
Versus
Jnanendra Nath Ghose & Anr. - Respondent
Decided On : 08-02-1929
The plea of guilty does not preclude the accused from challenging their conviction and sentence, and the Court must consider all relevant facts and circumstances before enhancing a sentence.
Headnote:
Enhancement of Sentence - Conviction - Sections 493, 109, I.P.C. - 33, Evidence Act - 271(2), 412, 439(6), Criminal P.C.
Fact of the Case:
The accused were convicted under Sections 493, 109, I.P.C. based on their own plea of guilty. The prosecution's inability to produce a key witness influenced the leniency of the sentences.
Finding of the Court:
The Court found the original sentences to be far too lenient, but due to the lack of evidence and procedural limitations, it was unable to enhance the sentences based on the existing record.
Issues: The main issue was whether the accused's plea of guilty conclusively determined the conviction and limited their ability to challenge the sentence.
Ratio Decidendi: The plea of guilty does not necessarily amount to a confession of all alleged facts. The accused has the right to show cause against their conviction and the sentence. The Court must consider all facts and circumstances before enhancing a sentence.
Final Decision: The Court made the rule absolute, setting aside the conviction of the accused and directing a regular trial and proper sentencing.
JUDGMENT
Mukerji, J. - Accused 1 Jnanendra Nath Ghosh alias Jnan Ghosh was convicted u/s 493, I.P.C., and sentenced to be detained till the rising of of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 500 or in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and accused 2 was convicted under Sections 493/ 109, I. P.C., and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 50 or in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months. They were convicted and sentenced as aforesaid by an Additional Sessions Judge of the 24-Parganas on 5th June 1928. The Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs then moved this Court for enhancement of the sentences passed upon the said two accused persons and originally the rule was issued as against both of them to show cause why their sentences should not be enhanced. Subsequently it was mentioned to the Court that accused 2 could not be found and upon that the rule as against accused 1 only was allowed to be proceeded with. It has now been heard by us in so far as it concerns that accused person.
2. I do not consider it necessary to set out the facts alleged on behalf of the prosecution upon which the charges on which the accused persons were committed to the Court of Sessions were framed. It is sufficient to say that the sentences-passed on the accused persons are on the face of them far too lenient. At the same time I find it impossible to enhance the sentences upon the materials such as they are on the record. To explain what I mean I shall have to set out a few facts.
3. The order-sheet of the Court of the Judge shows that on the charges against the two accused being read out and explained to them they pleaded "guilty" and they were convicted on their own plea. As reason for the sentence that he passed the Judge has recorded:
In consideration of the inability of the Prosecution to produce the girl who according to the Public Prosecutor is the only important witness in the case and the circumstances of the case, I deal with them leniently.
4. One thing is clear beyond doubt and that is his that without the girl's evidence the case could not go on, but beyond that I am not at all clear as to what actually took place. It may be that though the girl was not available, the prosecution were ready to go on with the trial by adducing the deposition of the girl taken before the Committing Magistrate as evidence at the trial after proving the facts necessary to be established in order to bring the case u/s 33, Evidence Act, or it may be that the prosecution were not in a position to proceed with the trial at all, because the girl was absent. On this point there is no affidavit on either side, and I am not at all sure that it is not one of those cases in which the accused pleads guilty to the charge in the hope of being leniently dealt with, the Public Prosecutor not pressing for severe sentences. All this, however, is only of minor importance.
5. Now, as far as I could understand the arguments adduced on behalf of the Crown, they are to the effect that the plea of " guilty " should be taken to conclude the accused altogether so that taking the facts alleged against the accused by the prosecution we should consider what is the proper sentence to be passed. This, in my opinion, is a wholly mistaken view of the situation. The plea of " guilty " is a plea to the charge and does not necessarily amount to a confession of all the facts alleged. The Court is not bound to, but it may, convict the accused on his plea : vide Section 271(2), Criminal P.C. The plea operates as a bar, in certain cases, to the preferring of an appeal except as to the extent and legality of the sentence : vide Section 412, Criminal P.C. By analogy with and also as a necessary consequence of the bar as regards appeals, a plea of guilty will perhaps also stand in the accused's way in the matter of a revision which he may seek for. But when called upon to show cause why his sentence should not be enhanced, the accused has the right to show cause again