1916 Supreme(Cal) 294
CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Fletcher, J.
Shama Kanta Chatterjee and Co. - Appellant
Versus
Kusum Kumari - Respondent
Decided On : 31-03-1916
Headnote:
Jurisdiction - Contract - Letters Patent Clause 12 - The court held that the plaintiff's suit was not maintainable as it failed to obtain leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, despite the fact that the plaint alleged the entire cause of action arose within the court's jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the defendant could not be estopped from raising the jurisdictional objection as the plaintiff's initial claim of complete jurisdiction was later found to be inaccurate. The court emphasized that the defendant could not waive a fact they were unaware of, and the plaintiff's assertion of complete jurisdiction obligated them to ensure its truthfulness.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff, a firm, sued the defendant to recover the price of goods sold and delivered to her husband. The dealings occurred between September 1911 and November 1913, with partial payments made, leaving a balance due for principal and interest. The plaintiff's plaint alleged the entire cause of action arose within the court's jurisdiction.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the prices of the goods were fair and reasonable, but rejected the plaintiff's claim for interest due to conflicting evidence. The court determined that the plaintiff's plaint incorrectly stated that the entire cause of action arose within the court's jurisdiction, as some transactions occurred outside the jurisdiction. The court concluded that the defendant could not be estopped from raising the jurisdictional objection, as they were unaware of the plaintiff's misrepresentation.
Issues: The issues were: (i) the price of goods supplied, (ii) the plaintiff's entitlement to interest, (iii) the maintainability of the suit without leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, and (iv) whether the defendant waived the jurisdictional objection.
Ratio Decidendi: The court applied the principle that a plaintiff cannot rely on the doctrine of estoppel to prevent a defendant from raising a jurisdictional objection when the plaintiff's initial claim of complete jurisdiction is later found to be inaccurate. The court held that the defendant cannot be expected to waive a fact they were unaware of, and the plaintiff's assertion of complete jurisdiction obligated them to ensure its truthfulness.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to try the case due to the plaintiff's failure to obtain leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.
JUDGMENT
Fletcher, J. - This is a suit brought by the plaintiffs' firm to recover Rs. 10,456-5-3 for price of goods sold and delivered to the husband of the defendant. The dealings are alleged to have taken place between the 23rd September 1911 and 22nd November 1913. Certain sums were paid in part payment of the amounts, leaving a balance of Rs. 7,877-5-3 due for principal and Rs. 2,579 for interest, calculated at the rate of 12 per cent, per annum up to the 19th December 1914, aggregating to Rs. 10,456-5-3, the amount claimed in this suit. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff company has frankly admitted in conducting the case, as presented, that the plaint alleges that the whole of the cause of action arose within the local limit of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court. That is manifest both from the statement in paragraph 1 and in paragraph 6 of the plaint. The plaintiff alleges in both paragraphs that the whole of the cause of action arose within the local limits of the. Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court. The defendant thereupon has submitted that part of the cause of action arose outside the local limits of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction and no leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent was obtained by the plaintiffs. The defendant has pleaded both on the merits and jurisdiction; first of all, on the merits, and secondly, she pleaded want of jurisdiction in the Court to try this suit on the ground that a portion of the cause of action arose outside the local limits of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court, and, therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction to try this case without the leave of the Judge of the Court having been obtained under Clause 12 of the Charter. Those objections the defendant has insisted upon down to the trial. The following issues were settled between the parties: (i) What goods were supplied by the plaintiffs to the defendant's husband and what is the fair and reasonable price thereof? (ii) Are the plaintiffs entitled to claim interest on the value of the goods supplied? (iii) The plaintiffs not having taken leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent is the suit maintainable in t-his Court? (iv) Has the defendant waived the objection mentioned in issue No. (iii)? I have no doubt that the prices of the goods were fair and reasonable; the' prices charged may have been a little higher than could have been obtained elsewhere; but the deceased must have known from time to to time what prices he was being charged for these goods and he must be taken to have approved of these prices. The first issue I decide in favour of the plaintiff Co. The second issue raised the question as to the agreement to pay, interest. A member of the plaintiff firm has spoken about an express agreement by the Raja to pay interest on the amount in arrear. That evidence about the agreement to pay interest has been contradicted by the Dewan of the Raja and I think the Dewan's evidence ought to be accepted in preference to that of the plaintiffs' roan. The bill or draft of the promissory rotes that was presented on the death of the Raja for signature by the executor shows that the claim for interest was not put forward. I cannot believe the plaintiffs' story about the express agreement to pay-interest at the rate of 12 per cent, per annum. The third question is about the question of jurisdiction. There is a class of cases, of which the case of King v. Secretary of State 35 C. 394 : 1 C.L.J. 441 : 12 C.W.N. 705 and the case of Suckan v. Weiner (1901) 17 T.L.R. 494 have been cited as examples, where the Court has jurisdiction to try the case if the whole of the cause of action has arisen within the local limits of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction or the consent of a Court being obtained when a portion of the cause of action arises outside the local limits of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction. There are two classes of these cases: one where the plaintiff in his