The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the term 'institution of proceedings' under the Indian Arms Act and the effect of delayed sanction on the validity of the proceedings and trial.

JUDGMENT

1. This is an appeal against an order of conviction and sentence u/s 19(f) read with Section 19A of the Indian Arms Act made at a trial held at the Criminal Sessions of this Court. The accused was charged on two counts: (i) in respect of possession of a revolver on November 25, 1946, u/s 19(f)/19A and (ii) in respect of possession at the same time of two cartridges u/s 19(f). The verdict of the jury was unanimous and the accused was sentenced to five years rigorous imprisonment on the count in respect of the revolver.

2. The prosecution case very briefly was that, acting on information, Inspector Jennings deputed Sub-Inspector Naresh Sarkar to act as a bogus purchaser of a revolver. The party went to Lower Chitpore Road in the evening of the 25th November. Naresh, Sarkar was introduced to the accused Muzaffar Shah by the informant in a narrow passage off the main road. He was shown the revolver by the accused and they bargained for the payment. Sarkar had Rs. 300 in marked notes with him. The accused wanted Rs. 350. Eventually the accused agreed to accept Rs. 300 which was paid over to him. Sarkar induced the accused to hold the revolver and to take it to his car. Thereupon, on a signal from Sarkar, Inspector Jennings with two Sub-Inspectors Das and Chatterji, who had been kept concealed nearby, came up and arrested the accused with the revolver and the cartridges. A search-list was prepared which was signed by two search witnesses.

3. The case was treated as one of possession u/s 19(f) and not as one of sale u/s 19(a), as it might have been and this has given rise to some difficulties.

4. The first point taken on behalf of the accused is that the proceedings in this case are bad in view of the failure to comply with the provisions of Section 29 of the Indian Arms Act. After the search the accused had been taken to the thana and was placed the Magistrate the following day, the 26th November. On the 1st December the Commissioner of Police gave a written order of sanction to the "prosecution" of the accused u/s 29 of the Indian Arms Act. A chalan in the case was eventually submitted on February 3, 1947. The question involved is at what point of time are proceedings "instituted" within the meaning of Section 29 of the Indian Arms Act. Ordinarily, it has always been assumed that the point of time referred to was when the prosecution was started by the submission of a chalan in the case on which the Court could take cognisance. No case has been brought to our notice in which any other view has been taken. The difficulty arises, however, from the terms of Section 30 of the Act, in which it is laid down that, where a search is to be made in the course of "any proceeding "instituted in respect of an offence punishable u/s 19, "Clause (f)," an officer of a certain rank must make the search. The phrase used in this section is exactly the same as that used in Section 29. It is now contended before us that, therefore, as the two phrases must have the same meaning in the two sections and as the phrase in Section 30 means that the "institution" of proceedings takes place sometime before the search is made, therefore, the ordinary interpretation so far followed u/s 29 is not correct. The proceedings in this case were instituted when Inspector Jennings, acting on information, set out to catch the accused with the revolver.

5. It is further argued, relying on the case of Basdeo Agarwalla v. King Emperor (1945) F.C.R. 93 that all proceedings in the absence of sanction are null and void and therefore, the whole proceedings including the trial are bad.

6. The only case brought to our notice in which the effect of Section 30 on the interpretation of Section 29 of the Arms Act is considered is the case of Emperor v. Kutru (1925) ILR 47 All. 575. There, the question was considered by Boys J., who held that the same meaning must, in the absence of any reason to the contrary, be given to the terms in Section 29 and in Section 30. He then, argued th