The main legal point established in the judgment is that for an act to constitute revivor under Article 183 of the Limitation Act, there must be a determination, either in express terms or by implication, that the decree is still capable of execution.

JUDGMENT

1. This appeal arises out of a proceeding in execution of a decree passed in the Original Side of this Court. It is necessary to give a short history of the litigation. The decree was passed on the 25 th July 1904. In 1905, it was transmitted to the Hughli Court for execution which ended on the 16th November 1905, according to the Court below, but on the 20th January 1906 according to the certificate issued by this Court and printed at page 34 of Part II of the paper-book. On the 19th November, 1917, the respondent decree-holder again applied for execution and notice was served upon the appellants on the 19th December 1917, and the execution case was struck off on the 21st December 1917, with a remark "dismissed for want of prosecution." The application for the present execution was presented on the 17th February 1921, and it was prayed that certain properties belonging to the appellants' father might be attached in execution of the decree. The appellants who are the present judgment-debtors raised various objections to the execution of the decree. The learned Subordinate Judge in the Court below overruled all those objections and held that the decree was capable of execution and ordered attachment of some of the properties mentioned in the application for execution and released some other properties holding that they were not in the occupation of the judgment-debtors.

The judgment-debtors have appealed and two points have been taken by them. They urge, in the first place, that the execution is barred by limitation under Article 183 of the first schedule to the Limitation Act of 1908; and, in the second place, it is contended that the decision of the Court below that the properties which it has ordered to be attached as belonging to the appellants' father is wrong. There is also a cross objection by the respondent with reference to the properties released by the lower Court.

2. We have heard both the parties on the first question raised in the appeal, namely, that of limitation and we think that this plea ought to succeed. We do not think it necessary to enter into the second point raised before us. The learned Subordinate Judge has, according to both the parties, misconceived the facts of this case so far as they relate to the objection on the ground of limitation. Ho has further fallen into error in confusing the provisions of Articles 182 and 183 of the Limitation Act; or, in other words, treated the expression "step in aid of execution" as used in Article 182 as co-extensive in meaning with the term 'revivor' under Article 183. He found that the execution case of 1905 was finally dismissed on the 16th November 1905. The second execution case of 1917 was started on the 19th November 1917, and so the execution of 1917 was clearly barred by limitation. But as the decree-holder applied to the High Court for transmission of the decree to the Court at Howrah in October 1917, which act of the decree-holder the learned Judge considers to be a step-in-aid of execution, he holds that the execution in 1917 was not barred by limitation. He has not considered whether the present execution was affected by limitation. Both sides have been unable to support the reasoning of the learned Subordinate Judge. The appellants do not challenge the execution in 1917 because it appears from the documents filed in the case that the previous execution was finally disposed of on the 20th January 1906. But their main contention is that the execution taken in 1917 did not operate as a revivor within the meaning of Article 183, Limitation Act and that the execution taken in 1921 (the present execution) was beyond 12 years from the date of the last effective execution and therefore barred. That article provides a period of 12 years within which execution should be taken of a decree or order of any Court established by Royal Charter in the exercise of its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction; and the time is to be reckoned from the date when a presen