JUDGMENT

Teunon, J. - In this ease one Lolit Mohan Singh Roy was plated on his trial before the Sessions Court of Hooghly on a charge of murder. The trial was by Jury and by their unanimous verdict the Jury found him not guilty. Accepting the verdict, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the accused, and against this order of acquittal the Local Government has preferred the present appeal. The person whose death is in question is a young girl or woman, Taralika Debi, the 2nd wife of the accused. She was about 16 years of age while the accused is over 50, and the case for the prosecution is that on the night of the 23rd March 1920, or early morning of the 24th, while they were in their bed-room together the accused, from motives of jealousy, attacked his wife with a sword, inflicting many injuries on her neck, head, face and other parts of her person and causing practically instantaneous death.

2. The first information of the murder was lodged at the Thanah (Pursura) by the accused himself at 7 A.m. on the 24th of March and the main ground taken in this appeal is, that this first information, or all but the first portion thereof, marked "Bxhibit 21," has been erroneously excluded from the consideration of the Jury, as amounting to a confession made to a Police Officer.

3. That by reason of the provisions of Section 25 of the Evidence Act the first information is not admissible in its entirety is conceded. But it is contended that the preliminary portions of the first information, giving a history or narrative of events preceding the night of the 23rd of March, are admissible as statements or admissions not being confessions, and that of the 2nd half of the first information, such portions as led to discovery, e.g. in the bed room, of the dead woman's body, the sword and a certain padlock are admissible under the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

4. In support of the first branch of this contention reference is made to Section 21 of the Evidence Act and to certain decisions of this Court, more particularly the eases reported as Queen v. Macdanald 10 B.L.R. App. 2; Queen-Empress v. Meher Ali Mullick 15 C. 589 : 7 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 976 and Emperor v. Kangal Mali 26 Ind. Cas. 161 : 41 C. 601 : 15 Cr. L.J. 713, also the judgment of Carnduff, J., in Barindra Kumar Ghose v. Emperor 7 Ind. Cas. 359 : 37 C. 467 : 14 C.W.N. 1114 : 11 Cri. L.J. 453.

5. On the other hand, on behalf of the accused it is contended that as part of the first information is inadmissible, the whole is inadmissible and that the preliminary narrative should be regarded as merely leading up to the confession and not severable from it.

6. Though, no doubt, when portions of a statement are admitted, the persons affected thereby may demand that the statement should be admitted and considered in its entirety, yet the principle that portions of a statement or confession may be admitted and others excluded is recognised in the Evidence Act itself (e,g., Section 27) and also in the cases cited in support of the appeal. We are, therefore, of opinion that, as contended by the Crown, the first information, in so far as it speaks of events prior to the eight of occurrence, i.e,, down to the words "I have not been successful," if and when proved, is admissible in evidence.

7. With regard to the second branch of the Crown's contention, the principle enunciated in Section 27 of the Evidence Act cannot be disputed. But one of our difficulties here is that the first information was excluded at the outset of the trial and before any evidence had been taken. The examination of the Police Officer or Officers has, therefore, not been directed to the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. All we can say, therefore, on this point is that if and when certain facts are deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from the accused when in custody of the Police, so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact or facts thereby discovered will become