The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of Section 154 and Order 20, Rule 18, Civil P. C. in determining the competency of a decree for partition and the allocation of costs for improvements.

JUDGMENT

Rau, J. - This is an appeal by the plaintiff against a final decree in a suit for partition of a temporarily settled estate being No. 2989 of the 24-Parganas District, the plaintiff's share being one-fourth. The main point taken before us is that the decree is incompetent or irregular by reason of Section 154, Civil P. C. This section runs:

Where the decree is for the partition of an undivided estate assessed to the payment of revenue to the Government or for the separate possession of a share of such an estate the partition of the estate or, the separation of the share shall be made by the Collector or any gazetted Subordinate of the Collector deputed by him in this behalf in accordance with the law if any for the time being in force relating to the partition or the separate possession of the shares of such estates.

This should be read along with Order 20, Rule 18, Civil P. C, which for convenience is reproduced here:

Where the Court passes a decree for the partition of property or for the separate possession of a share therein, then, (1) if and in so far as the decree relates to an estate assessed to the payment of revenue to the Government, the decree shall declare the rights of the several parties interested in the property, but shall direct such partition or 'separation to be made by the Collector, or any gazetted subordinate of the Collector deputed by him 'in this behalf, in accordance with such declaration and with the provisions of Section 54; (2) if and in so far as such decree relates to any other immovable property or to moveable property, the Court may if the partition or separation cannot be conveniently made without further inquiry, pass a preliminary decree declaring the rights of the several parties interested in the property and giving such further directions as may be required.

2. The preliminary decree in the present case was for the partition of an undivided estate assessed for the payment of revenue to the Government, and the appellant's contention is that both as required by the section and by the rule quoted above the decree should have directed partition to be made by the Collector and that the Court was wrong in proceeding to make a partition of its own. This point might have been taken but it was not taken in the appeal against the preliminary decree, and it is, therefore, a question whether it can be taken now in an appeal against the final decree. In the view which we take on the merits of the appeal, however, it is not necessary for us to decide this question.

3. We proceed to the merits. It appears that in this case the plaintiff while asking for partition did not ask for any separate allotment of the Government revenue, so that the land of the entire estate was to continue to be liable for the whole of the land revenue. In Jogodishury Debea v. Kailash Chundra Lahiry 24 WB. 725, which was heard by a Pull Bench of five judges of this Court, the question which was propounded for decision was,

whether having regard to the provisions of Section 265, Civil P. C. (now Section 54), the civil Court can make a partition of land of a revenue paying estate when no separate allotment of Government revenue is asked for.

It was held by a majority of three to two that the question must be answered in the affirmative. In a subsequent case however Abdul Razak Vs. Sreenath Ghose and Another, AIR 1931 Cal 93 a Division Bench of two Judges of this Court appear to have expressed their concurrence with the minority in Jogodishury Debea v. Kailash Chundra Lahiry 24 WB. 725 , so that so far as this Court is concerned, there is actually a majority of four to three against the majority in the Pull Bench case. We are, however, bound by the Pull Bench decision until it is overruled by higher authority. We may add that in the case in Radha Kishun and Another Vs. Bhola Chaudhuri and Others, AIR 1934 Patna 365 , the Patna High Court following the authority of the Pull Bench decision mentioned above held that Section 54 does