The main legal point established in the judgment is the application of limitation laws, specifically Article 142 and Article 140 of the Limitation Act, and the interpretation of the provisions of the Estates Partition Act 1876 in determining the plaintiff's claim for title and possession of certain lands.

JUDGMENT

Henderson, J. - This appeal is by defendants 1 to 6. The plaintiff instituted the suit for a declaration of his title to and to recover khas possession of certain lands as appertaining to his Zemindari. The appellants, who were the contesting defendants, are the proprietors of another Zemindari. The plaintiff's case is that his grandmother was dispossessed by the predecessor in interest of the defendants in the year 1285. The learned Munsif decreed the suit in part. The present appellants appealed. The learned Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had not established his title to some of the lands decreed in his favour and allowed the appeal in part The defendants have now appealed to this Court. The plaintiff has filed a cross-objection in which he contends that the decree of the plaintiff should be restored. Three points have been taken on behalf of the appellants: (1) that the suit is barred by limitation; (2) that it is barred u/s 149, Estates Partition Act 1876 and (3) that when the learned Subordinate Judge did not accept the plaintiffs story with regard to dispossession he should have dismissed the suit.

2. In order to understand the argument with regard to the point of limitation it is necessary to set out certain facts. The plaintiff's grandfather Goloke Nath Roy Choudhury was the proprietor of the Zemindari and died in the year 1846. He was succeeded by his widow Janhavi Choudhurani who had the estate of a Hindu widow. In the year 1848 she adopted Baikuntha Nath Roy. After attaining majority Baikuntha executed an ekrarnama in favour of the lady by which he gave her a life interest in the estate. This document was executed in 1865. The lady was dispossessed in the year 1878. Baikuntha died in 1887 and the lady died in 1900. She was succeeded by Baikuntha's widow Rani Dinamoni Choudhurani who had the estate of a Hindu widow. She adopted the plaintiff in 1914 and died in 1918. It is thus clear that the plaintiff got an absolute estate in the year 1914. He alleges previous possession and dispossession and on these facts Article 14 2, Limitation Act, would apply. Mr. Ghose, however, has argued that Article 140 applies in view of Ex. 4 which is a document executed by the natural father of the plaintiff in favour of Dinamoni. Dr. Basak has contended on the other side that this document does not affect the period of limitation for three reasons. The first reason is that no such case was ever made in the plaint. The suit was prima facie barred by limitation. It was therefore for the plaintiff to set out the facts on which he relied to show that the suit was not barred. This part of his case will be found in para. 3 of the plaint. It sets out that though he had obtained an absolute estate he was a minor and Dinamoni continued to hold possession of the property as his guardian. If he had intended to make out a case that Article 140 applied in view of the document. Ex. 4 he should have definitely raised the question in his plaint.

3. The second ground alleged is that Ex. 4 did not create any life estate in favour of Dinamoni. This document was executed by the plaintiff's father in favour of Dinamoni and really contains the terms of the agreement made between him and Dinamoni with regard to the adoption of the plaintiff It is obvious that such a document could not in itself create any estate in favour of Dinamoni. The executant had no interest in the property at all and it was not possible for him to carve a life estate out of an absolute estate which did not exist and might never come into existence. The plaintiff can only succeed if it can be shown that although no estate in favour of Dinamoni was created he is prevented from questioning the agreement made with her by his father. It is clear that no case of estoppel can arise as the plaintiff does not claim the estate through his father. Mr. Ghose contended that what the father was really doing was to make a contract for the benefit of his minor son,