1939 Supreme(Cal) 184
CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Edgley, J.
Biswa Nath Das - Appellant
Versus
Khejerali Molla - Respondent
Decided On : 17-03-1939
Headnote:
pauper application - rejection of application to sue in forma pauperis - Order 33, Rule 7, Civil P. C. - Aubhoya Churn Dey v. Bisseswari (1897) 24 Cal 889, Jagadiswari Debi and Others Vs. Tinkari Bibi and Others, AIR 1936 Cal 28 - conflicting views on the effect of rejection of pauper application on treating the original application as a plaint - interpretation of Order 33, Rule 15, Civil P.C. - legal provisions and their interpretations influencing the court's decision
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner applied to sue the opposite party in forma pauperis for the recovery of a sum of money alleged to be due to him. After various applications and hearings, the learned Munsif refused the petitioner's application to sue as a pauper and directed that the court-fees should be accepted with effect from a later date, potentially making the petitioner's mortgage suit time-barred.
Finding of the Court:
The court analyzed conflicting views on the effect of rejecting a pauper application on treating the original application as a plaint. The court found that the rejection of the pauper application under Order 33, Rule 7, Civil P.C. acts as a bar to treating the original application as a plaint, and the applicant must institute a fresh suit in the ordinary manner.
Issues: The main issue was whether, after refusing the petitioner's application to sue as a pauper, the court should have allowed the petitioner to convert his pauper application into a plaint with effect from the date of the original application.
Ratio Decidendi: The court interpreted Order 33, Rule 15, Civil P.C. and held that the rejection of a pauper application under Order 33, Rule 7, acts as a bar to treating the original application as a plaint, and the applicant must institute a fresh suit in the ordinary manner.
Final Decision: The court discharged the rule with costs, directing the learned Munsif to fix a date for the deposit of costs as a condition precedent to presenting a fresh plaint with the court-fees already filed in Court. Limitation would run from the date on which the plaint is actually presented.
ORDER
Edgley, J. - This rule is directed against the order of the Third Munsif, Alipore, dated 23rd December 1938, whereby he refused the petitioner permission to convert a plaint attached to an application to, sue in forma pauperis into a regular plaint with effect from the date of the presentation of his pauper application and directed that the petitioner's plaint should be registered with effect from the date of filing courts fees in the Court below and not with effect from the date upon which the pauper application was presented. The relevant facts connected with this matter are briefly as follows: On 11th April 1938 the petitioner applied in the Court of the learned Munsif to sue the opposite party in forma pauperis for the recovery of a sum of money alleged to be due to him by Khejer Ali Mollah, the opposite party, under a mortgage bond. The case was numbered as pauper case, 112 of 1938. While this particular case was pending, a similar application filed by the petitioner in case No. 88 of 1938 was dismissed by the learned Munsif on 31st October 1938, on the ground that the applicant had the necessary means to enable him to pay the court-fees due in respect of the relief sought by him in that case. Thereafter the requisite steps were taken in connexion with case No. 112 of 1938 to hear the matter under Order 33, Rule 7, Civil P. C. Hajiraa were duly filed but, on 5th November 1938, the petitioner applied for time which was granted until 26th November 1938, which day was fixed for the peremptory hearing of the case. On the latter date, the petitioner filed a further application for time in which he informed the Court that he did not think it proper to prosecute his application to sue in forma pauperis and asked that he might be allowed to carry on the suit by paying the proper court-fees, and by converting into a regular plaint the plaint which was filed with his pauper application. The learned Munsif on receipt of this application directed that the matter should be put up on 17th December 1938 for further hearing. On this date the petitioner filed two further applications; in the first of these applications he repeated the request contained in the petition which he had filed on 26th November 1938, and informed the Court that he had filed court-fees to the value of Rs. 90 payable on account of the relief sought by him in the mortgage suit. In the second application he asked that his original pauper application should be rejected and requested the Court to pass orders for the registration of the plaint attached to his pauper application on acceptance of the requisite court-fees. The learned Munsif heard the parties with reference to this matter and, on 23rd December 1938, he then made the order against which this rule is directed.
2. It follows from the recital of the above mentioned facts that, as the matter stood before the learned Munsif on 17th December 1938, he had been asked by the petitioner (l) to reject the application to sue in forma pauperis which had been filed on 11th April 1938 and (2) to convert the plaint which was attached to and formed part of the original application into an ordinary plaint. It also appears to have been the wish of the applicant that the conversion should take effect from 11th April 1938 in order that the relief sought by him in the mortgage suit might not become time-barred under the law of limitation. The learned Munsif by his order dated 23rd December 1938, granted the petitioner's request to the effect that his pauper application should be rejected. Prom the circumstances in; which the order was made it must be taken to be an order under Order 33, Rule 7 (3), Civil P. C., refusing to allow the applicant to sue as a pauper. The learned Munsif also directed that the court-fees should be accepted with effect from 17th December 1938 and not from the earlier date. This order therefore, as it stands, would probably have the effect of making the petitioner's mortgage suit time-barred, and it