The central legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, emphasizing the need for strict application of the prohibition against false and fabricated confessions.

JUDGMENT

Graham, J. - This is an appeal by the Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, Bengal against the verdict of the jury and order of acquittal passed thereon by the Sessions Judge of Malda on a charge u/s 302, I.P.C.

2. The case for the prosecution was that the accused Bhajoo Majhi murdered one Baneswar on the night of 25th February 1928, the motive for the crime being alleged to be a love intrigue between the accused and the deceased's wife Munia.

3. The jury brought in a unanimous verdict of not guilty and the learned Judge accepting it acquitted the accused.

4. In support of the appeal against that order two main grounds have been urged, firstly, that the jury was not constituted according to law, as there were only seven jurors instead of nine as required by Section 326(1) read with the proviso to Section 274(2), Criminal P.C. This ground has not as a matter of fact been taken in the petition of appeal and was only put forward at the 11th hour. We do not think, therefore, that it ought at so late a stage so be entertained. It appears moreover that no objection of any kind was raised at the trial, nor has any allegation been made that the accused were prejudiced in any way.

5. This ground accordingly fails and must be disallowed. The second ground urged on behalf of the appellant is that the learned Sessions Judge erred in rejecting evidence as to certain statements and conduct of the accused in pointing out places at which discoveries of importance were made as a consequence of the information given by him. These statements are referred to in para. 8 of the petition of appeal, and the question which arises in connexion with them is, whether they should have been allowed to go in evidence in their entirety, that is to say, including the admissions said to have been made by the accused that he had killed the deceased and had thrown his body into the river, or whether only so much of the information given by the accused as related to the actual discovery of the blood stains near the tree and the articles of clothing in the river was admissible.

6. The answer depends upon the construction to be put on Section 27, Evidence Act. That section is in the nature of a proviso to the proceeding Section 26. Section 26 reads as follows:

No confession made by any person whilst ho is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person.

7. Section 27 goes on to say:

Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.

8. The precise meaning to be abbached to Section 27 is not altogether free from difficulty, and it is possible to interpret it as allowing even a confession of guilt to go in provided it has led to discovery. On the other hand it may be read as meaning no more than that the facts discovered may be proved excluding the actual confession So far as this Court is concerned the more restricted interpretation has been given to the section, and it appears to be well settled that only so much of the information can be allowed to go in as relates distinctly or immediately to discovery. That seems to be the correct view of the section. The language bears that interpretation, and I do not think it can ever have been the intention of the legislature to admit statements containing an actual confession of the crime. A distinction is apparently drawn between that part of the information which leads directly to discovery of material facts, and that part of it which cannot in itself be held to lead to any discovery, the principle underlying the distinction being that discovery affords some guarantee of the truth of a portion of the statement, but not necessarily of the whole. If that portion of the