The main legal principle established in the judgment is the application and interpretation of Article 134-B of the Limitation Act in determining the binding nature of property transfers and the impact of the statutory period on the rights of the original owner and the transferee.

JUDGMENT

1. The suit out of which this appeal arises was instituted by the appellant in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Bankura, for khas possession of certain lands and in the alternative for settlement of fair and equitable rent for the lands. The learned Subordinate Judge passed a decree for khas possession in favour of the plaintiff. On appeal by the defendants to the District Judge of Bankura the suit has been dismissed on the ground that it is barred by limitation. Hence this second appeal. The only point for determination in this appeal is whether the District Judge was right in dismissing the suit as barred by limitation. The material facts which are not in dispute now are as follows: The properties in suit belong to a deity called Sri Sri Raghunath Jieu, installed in days gone by, by the then Maharaja of Bishnupur in the Belut Asthal in the District of Bankura. On 3rd March 1868, Ramdas, Mohunt of this Asthal, gave a Mokarari lease of the disputed lands to the predecessor of the defendants at a fixed rent of Rs. 77-8-0 per year though there was no legal necessity for granting such mokarari lease, and went on receiving from the lessee the rent reserved by the lease till his death which took place in the year 1899. His successor Gokuldas Mohunt recognized this tenancy by accepting rent from the lessee. He died in May or June 1929. Plaintiff who succeeded him as Mohunt after his death repudiated the tenancy and brought the present suit on 25th February 1932, for the reliefs mentioned above. On these facts the District Judge held that the suit came under Article 134-B, Lim. Act, and was barred by limitation. It is contended on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant that Article 134-B does not apply to this suit inasmuch as the lease in this case was granted before the amending Act of 1929 which introduced this article in the Limitation Act of 1908 came into force. In support of this contention plaintiff relies upon the following passage in Article 426 of the Right Hon'ble Sir Dinshaw Mulla's Principles of Hindu Law, Edn. 8: "This Act (Act 1 of 1929) can apply only to transfers made on or after 1st January 1929". It would be useful to indicate here briefly the state of the law on this subject before the amending Act of 1929 was passed. Article 134 of Act 15 of 1877 was in these terms:

To recover possession of immovable properties conveyed      12 years    Date of transferor bequeathed in trust and afterwards purchased from thetrustee or mortgagee for a valuable consideration.

2. There was a conflict of authority on the construction of the word 'purchase' in this article. Calcutta, Bombay, Madras and Allahabad High Courts held that transfer by way of a mortgage or permanent lease came under this article while the Punjab High Court held that the article contemplated only transfer of full ownership. In the year Abhiram Goswami v. Shyama Charan Nandi (1909) 36 Cal 1003 the Privy Council held that Article 134 of the Act of 1877 had no application to a mortgage or lease, that a grantee under a lease was not a purchaser within the meaning of that Article and that a purchaser within the meaning of that Article must be the purchaser of absolute title. In 1908 the word "purchase" in this Article was substituted by the word "transfer". The object of this amendment was to bring all transfers within the scope of Article 134. Prior to the decision of the Privy Council in Vidyavaruthi Tirtha v. Baluswami Aiyer AIR 1922 P C 123 in the year 1921 it was generally assumed that Article 134 applied to transfers of properties belonging to Hindu and Mahomedan religious or charitable endowments by the previous Manager. In Vidyavaruthi Tirtha v. Baluswami Aiyer AIR 1922 P C 123 the Judicial Committee laid down that Article did not apply where the head of Hindu or Mahomedan religious institution granted a permanent lease over a part of the endowed property. The result of this pronouncement of the Judicial Committee was that the residuary Article 144 ap