JUDGMENT

1. This is an appeal by the defendants in a suit for establishment of title to land. The claim was dismissed by the trial Court, whereupon the plaintiffs preferred an appeal. This was beard on the 6tb May 1915 by Mr. Asutosh Ghose, First Subordinate Judge of Hooghly, who reserved judgment. On the 29th May 1915 Mr. Ghose wrote, sigred and dated his judgment. It appears that during a portion of every month the First Subordinate Judge bad to discharge his judicial duties in another station in the district. While Mr. Ghose was thus absent from the headquarters, the judgment was delivered on the 31tt May 1915 by Mr. U.B. Mookerjee, the Second Subordinate Judge, who was in charge of the first Court during the temperary absence of Mr. Ghohe, The decree was drawn up in due course and was signed by Mr. Ghose on the 4th June 1915, but as required by Order XX, Rule 7, of the CPC bore the date when the judgment was pronounced, that is, the 31st May 1915. As the suit was decreed by the Subordinate Judge, the defendants have appealed to this Court, and the only point pressed is that there is no legal judgment which can form the foundation for a valid decree.

2. The provisions of the CPC relevant for the determination of the question raised are as follows:

3. Order XX, Rule 1. The Court, after the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment in open Court, either at once or on some future day, of which due notice shall be given to the parties or their Pleaders.

4. Order XX, Rule 2. A Judge may pronounce a judgment written but not pronounced by his predecessor.

5. Order XX, Rule 3. The judgment shall be dated and signed by the Judge in open Court at the tine of pronouncing it, and, when once signed, shall not afterwards be altered or added to save as provided by Section 152 or on review.

6. It is plain that in the case before us, the judgment was not pronounced, dated and signed in conformity with the requirement of the Code. Here it may be observed that the paper signed by Mr. Ghose and kept on the record could not be treated as a valid judgment till it had been pronounced in Court; this view is supported by decisions OF unquestionable authority. In BRAND v, Hammersmith Ry. Co. ((1867) 2 Q.B. 223, (246.) Erle C.J. was one of the Judges who heard the case; he prepared a judgment, which could not be delivered as the other members of the Court were not then ready to give judgment, The Chief Justice resigned before the case could be set down for delivery of judgment and the opinion recorded by him was pot treated as a judgment. This was followed by Peacock, C.J., in Mahomed Akil v. Assadunnissa Bibee 9 W.R. 1; B.L.R. Sup, Vol. 774. That case was heard by a Full Bench of nice Judges, judgment was reserved after conclusion of the hearing, and the Judges, from time to time, lodged with the Registrar copies of the judgments which, they respectively intended to deliver. Two of these Judges retired from the Court, and one died, before the case was set down for delivery of judgment. It was unanimously held by the other six Judges (who were themselves equally divided in their opinion on the merits) that the opinions recorded by their late colleagues were only minutes or memorandums and could not be treated as operative judgments. The result was that under the Letters Patent the opinion of the Chief Justice prevailed, whereas the decision would have been to the contrary effect, if the rejected opinions had been taken into account. A still more remarkable instance of the principle applicable to cases of this character will be found in Lachman Prasad v. Ram Kishen 3 Ind. Cas. 1096; 33 A. 236; 7 A.L.J. 1189. There a Subordinate Judge heard an appeal recorded in the order sheet that judgment would be pronounced on a date mentioned, wrote out what took the form of a judgment in the case, and placed it on the record. But before the appointed day arrived, he ceased to be Subordinate Judge of the place. His successor in office did not pronounce the judgment