SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1943 Supreme(Cal) 185

CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Henderson, J.
Dwijendra Nath Talukdar & Anr. - Appellant
Versus
Makhon Lal Pramanik - Respondent
Decided On : 08-06-1943

The interpretation of Section 198, Criminal P.C. and the consideration of the husband as a person aggrieved in defamation cases.

Headnote:

Jurisdiction - Defamation - Interpretation of Section 198, Criminal P.C. - Husband as person aggrieved

Fact of the Case:

The petitioners were convicted of defamation for making allegations about the chastity of the complainant's wife. The rule was pressed on the grounds of jurisdiction and misjoinder of offences.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the husband is a person aggrieved under Section 198, Criminal P.C. due to social customs, and there was misjoinder of offences, leading to prejudice to the petitioners.

Issues: Jurisdiction under Section 198, Criminal P.C. and misjoinder of offences

Ratio Decidendi: The husband is considered a person aggrieved under Section 198, Criminal P.C. Misjoinder of offences led to prejudice and necessitated a retrial.

Final Decision: The convictions and sentences were set aside, fines refunded, and the petitioners were directed to be retried on a specific charge.

ORDER

Henderson, J. - This rule raises substantial points of law and I directed that notice should be Served upon the Crown for them to appear. Mr. Sen has duly appeared and has shown t cause against the rule. In this he has been joined by Mr. Lahiri appearing on behalf of the complainant. The petitioners have been convicted of defamation. Briefly the prosecution case is that they have been making allegations on various occasions and to various persons about the chastity of the complainant's wife. The first ground upon which the rule was pressed was that the Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence in view of the provisions of Section 198, Criminal P.C., as the person defamed was the wife and not the complainant. What the section lays down is that the complaint must be made by some person aggrieved. While it excludes complaints by busy bodies and mischief-makers, it does not say that the complaint can only be made by the person defamed. The question therefore is whether the husband is aggrieved when imputations are made upon the chastity of his wife.

2. In view of the social customs prevailing amongst the community to which the parties belong, there can be no question that the husband would suffer very serious social disadvantages on account of these imputations. I should find it very difficult to say that he was not a person aggrieved. There is how ever ample authority for, the view taken by the learned Magistrate : vide the cases in Chhotalal Lallubhai v. Nathabhai Bechar ('01) 25 Bom. 151, Gurdit Singh v. Emperor ('24) 11 AIR 1924 Lah. 559 and Chellam Naidu v. Ramasami ('91) 14 Mad. 379. In Thakur Das v. Adhar Chandra ('05) 32 Cal. 425, it was held that a brother is a person aggrieved when imputations are made against the chastity of a widowed sister living with him. The case of the husband is clearly stronger. The next question is one of misjoinder. Here there is not only misjoinder of the accused persons but also misjoinder of the offences alleged. The petitioners have been tried for no fewer than six offences; but the only one in which they are alleged to have acted jointly is that referred to in the h deposition of P.W. 5. It is difficult to understand what the learned Magistrate means when he refers to these offences as being committed in course of the same transaction. For example, P.W. 2 deposes that the complainant approached him with regard to the quarrel between the parties which is alleged to have been the cause of the ill-feeling. He is related to petitioner l. He asked petitioner 2 for an explanation. Petitioner 2 then told him that the real fact was that the parties were quarrelling because of the unchaste behaviour of the complainant's wife. It is quite obvious that this incident could have had nothing whatsoever to do with petitioner 1. In the course of his explanation, the learned Magistrate refers to a conspiracy between the two petitioners. Of course, they could have been jointly tried on a charge of conspiracy; but as there is no evidence whatsoever upon which such a charge could be framed, this matter is quite irrelevant.

3. In view of this misjoinder, it is quite inevitable that there should be a retrial. Even, however, if there were no misjoinder the charge has been framed in such a way that prejudice must have been caused to the petitioners. Prejudice must have resulted with regard to at least two matters. The charge refers to no fewer than 6 incidents. There are not even separate heads for each of these incidents. They are all jumbled up together, and the petitioners have been convicted once constructively for the whole lot. It is impossible to say whether P.Ws. 2 and 4 are deposing to two incidents or the same incident. My own view is that they intended to depose to one incident only. In the absence of further examination it is, however, impossible to say whether this view is correct or not. Then again, the learned Magistrate has dealt with the question of the exceptions in lump ins

Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
whatsapp-icon Back to top