The court emphasized the importance of specific details of fraud when challenging a consent decree and upheld the principles of the Probate and Administration Act regarding the extent of liability of an executor.

JUDGMENT

1. This is an appeal by the first defendant in a suit for administration, partition, accounts and incidental reliefs against an executor. Rakhal Chander Dey, the admitted owner of the subject-matter of the litigation, died on the 31st July 1901. Two days before his death, he made a testamentary disposition of his properties. He appointed his eldest son Pulin Behan Dey as executor and directed that his second son, Sattya Charan Dey, at that time an infant, do become joint executor on attainment of majority. He left a widow, Thakomoni Dasi, the mother of Satya Charan Dey, and his three sisters. His first wife, the mother of Pulin Behari Dey, had died during his lifetime many years before. After the death of Rakhal Chandra Dey Probate was taken out by Pulin Behari Dey on the 15th July 1903. Satya Charan Dey attained majority on the 16th February 1917 and took out joint Probate on the 12th July 1918. On the 20th August 1918 he instituted the present suit against his step-brother Pulin Behari Dey and his mother Thakomoni Dasi who was joined as the second defendant. The object of the suit was to obtain from Pulin Behari Dey, who had acted as executor during his minority, accounts of the management of the estate. The plaintiff also asked for administration of the estate in accordance with the terms of the Will of his father. The suit lasted for three years and was not taken up for final disposal till the 16th June 1921. On that day the case was heard ex parte and a preliminary decree was made. That decree is now assailed by the first defendant substantially on four grounds, viz., first, that the procedure adopted by the Subordinate Judge was unfair and made it impossible for the appellant to establish his defence before the Trial Court; secondly, that the order for accounts is unjust and incomplete; thirdly, that the Subordinate Judge should have held that the three properties mentioned in the schedule to the plaint had been validly created debutter and were consequently not liable to be treated as secular properties capable of division and, fourthly, that the order for maintenance in favour of the second defendant is contrary to the provisions of the Hindu Law.

2. As regards the first point, it is plain that the appellant has no substantial grievance. The plaint was lodged on the 20th August 1918 and after the written statement had been filed, issues were framed on the 30th January 1919. The plaintiff was diligent and on the 15th April 1919 he made an application for the issue of a Commission for the examination of his mother. The writ was issued on the 30th April 1919 and the examination was completed in due course. The first defendant, however, did not take any steps to summon his witnesses. It has been stated to us in justification of his conduct that, as the matters in difference were referred to arbitration, he believed in good faith that no "steps in Court would be necessary. We find, however, that the proceedings for arbitration which ultimately proved infructuous occupied the period between the nth August 1920 and the 2nd May 1921. It was not till a very late stage of the suit, that is, on the 1st June 1921, that the first defendant made an application for examination of a lady Kishoreemoyee Dasi on commission. This application was granted and a writ was issued in due course. On the 13th June however the first defendant applied for extention of time on the allegation that, the lady had been taken ill and could not be examined on Commission. The Subordinate Judge refused this application for adjournment on the ground that the defendant had net taken steps in time. A further application for adjournment was made on the same day and was refused on the ground that it was frivolous. The Subordinate Judge further expressed the opinion that the case which had been pending for three years should be heard as early as practicable. On the next day, the case was taken up for disposal; the first defendant, though repeatedly called,