The central legal point established in the judgment is that the Court's jurisdiction is limited to causes of action within its territorial limits, and procedural rules cannot extend its jurisdiction to claims arising outside its purview.

JUDGMENT

John Woodroffe, J. - This is a suit for the recovery of the value of 2 bales of piece goods alleged to have been delivered on the 7th April 1918 at Jagannath Ghat in Calcutta to the River Steam Navigation Co., Ltd., and the India General Steam Navigation and Railway Co., Ltd., for carriage, despatch and delivery by transmission to Bhuptiahi, a station on the Bengal and North-Western Railway, and which, it is said have not been delivered to the consignee at Bhuptiahi.

2. I need not go into the facts of the case so far as they affect the merits, because the point which has been argued before us is a question of jurisdiction, and in the view I take of the case it is unnecessary to deal with the question on the merits.

3. There is no question that the Court had jurisdiction as against the River Steamer Company. The question before us is whether it had jurisdiction against the Bengal and North-Western Railway Co., Ltd., the defendant-appellants, to whom I will refer as the Railway Company.

4. The learned Judge has held upon this point of jurisdiction that there is no doubt that when the goods were delivered in Calcutta for transmission to Bhuptiahi, there was, so far as the plaintiff firm was concerned, only one transaction; and he says that, that being so and this Court having undoubted jurisdiction to enquire into all matters relating to the carriage of the goods to Paleeza Ghat, Order I, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code, comes into play so far as the Railway Company are concerned. He was, therefore, of opinion that the Railway Company were properly joined as defendants in this suit. He has dismissed the suit against the Steamer Company and given judgment against the Railway Company for a sum of Rs. 3,627. The argument on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent has been that as the Court has jurisdiction over the suit, because it has jurisdiction as regards the Steamer Company, it must be taken that there is no longer any question of jurisdiction but one of procedure only, and Order I, Rule 3, justifies the decision which has been passed, namely, a decree against the Railway Company, the cause of action against which arose out of the jurisdiction. To this argument I cannot agree. There is no doubt that the cause of action against the Railway Company arose out of the jurisdiction from whatever point of view we may regard it. This is admittedly so, if the Steamer Company is regarded as the agent of the plaintiff to hand over the goods to the Railway Company at Paleeza Ghat outside the jurisdiction. This is also admittedly so, if the action is regarded as an action in tort to recover, the plaintiffs' goods from the Railway Company to whom they had been delivered; and, I think the cause of action equally arises out of the jurisdiction on the argument that the course of business in carrying the goods throughout constituted a cause of action arising in Calcutta. This, I think, cannot be maintained. The fact that the Court has jurisdiction against the Steamer Company does not give jurisdiction against the Railway Company. The fallacy of the argument, it appears to me, lies in the use of the words "the Court has jurisdiction over the suit." Such jurisdiction as the Court has is over the suit as regards the Steamer Company. This does not give jurisdiction over the Railway Company, and, in my opinion, Order I, Rule 3, has no bearing on the case. That rule of the Order is a provision which relates to a joinder of parties: and it assumes the existence of a suit in a proper forum, the Court having jurisdiction to try the suit. If the Court has such jurisdiction, then Order 1, Rule 3 may come into play.

5. No case has been cited to us in support of the plaintiff-respondent's contention: and, so far as it goes, the decision in Krishna Kishore De v. Amar Nath Khettry 56 Ind. Cas. 532 : 47 C. 770 : 31 C.L.J. 272 : 24 C.W.N. 633 appears to be against that contention.

6. It is said that, to hold otherwise, that is to say, that there was no jurisdiction,