JUDGMENT

1. The subject-matter of the litigation which has given rise to this appeal is a tract of 17 bighas of land in Mouzah Sripat Ratankhap of which the plaintiffs-appellants seek to recover possession on the ground that it formed their nagdi kasht land. The defendants denied that the land in dispute was the nagdi kasht of the plaintiffs. The Court of first instance decreed the suit. Upon appeal, the District Judge has reversed that decision.

2. The plaintiffs have now appealed to this Court. On their behalf, the decision of the District Judge has been challenged on the ground that he has excluded from consideration two pieces of documentary evidence which are admissible in evidence and had been rightly admitted as such by the Court of first instance. The documents in question are certain teishkhana papers and a road-cess return.

3. In so far as the first document is concerned, it has been contended that it is admissible in evidence upon the authority of the decision of this Court in the cases of Baij Nath Singh v. Sukhu Mahton 18 C. 534and Samar Dasadh v. Juggul Kishore Singh 23 C. 366. In our opinion, the cases upon which reliance is placed are clearly distinguishable and are of no assistance to the appellants. They merely lay down that a teishkhana register prepared by a patwari under rules framed by the Board of Revenue under Regulation XII of 1817, though not a public document, is admissible in evidence, if properly proved. In fact, the teishkhana paper is a document prepared in the office of the zemindar by a patwari who is paid by the zemindar but approved by the Collector. It is a register kept for the information of the Collector, but it is in no sense an official record. In the case before us, it was disputed on behalf of the defendants that the person who is said to have kept the teishkhana paper was a patwari approved by the Collector. It was, therefore, obligatory upon the plaintiffs, before the trishkhana paper could be used in evidence, to prove that it had been kept in due course by the registered patwari. They did not, however, examine Sukhi Lal, the alleged patwari; and the District Judge very properly says that their failure to call this witness shows that it cannot be treated as evidence. In our opinion, the District Judge has not treated the teishkhana paper as inadmissible in evidence. He has rejected it on the ground that it had not been proved to be kept by a registered patwari. This is obviously a valid ground why no reliance should be placed on it.

4. In so far as the second document in concerned, namely, the road-cess paper, it appears to have been filed, on the 18th June 1903, by the proprietors interested to the extent of an one-fourth share in the property. It was a return filed for the years 1306 to 1303; and so far as we can gather, on the basis thereof cases were assessed not merely in respect of the shares of the proprietors who made the return but in respect of the whole property. The learned Vakil for the defendants-respondents has contended that the road-cess return is admissible in evidence only as against the persons who made the return, and that it is not admissible in evidence as against a stranger. In support of this view, he has placed reliance upon Section 95 of the Bengal Cess Act of 1880 and upon the decision of this Court in the case of Nusseerun v. Gouri Sunker Singh 22 W.R. 192. Now Section 95 of the Cess Act provides that "every return filed by, or on behalf of, any person in pursuance of the provisions of this part shall bear the signature and address of such person or his authorised agent, and shall be admissible in evidence against such person, but shall not be admissible in his favour." In our opinion, Section 95 on which reliance is placed is not exhaustive. It was intended to restrict the operation of Section 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, which makes an admission ordinarily proveable as against the person who makes it or his representative-in-interest, but lays down cert