JUDGMENT

Banerjee, J. - The question referred to us for determination is this:

Can an order u/s 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for the payment of compensation to an accused person, be made in a case which is false as well as frivolous or vexatious?

2. The reference has been rendered necessary in consequence of the learned Judges before whom this case came on for hearing being unable to agree in the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Parsi Hajra v. Bandhi Dhanuk ILR (1900) Cal. 251.

3. The answer to the question depends upon the construction of Section 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That section enacts that, if in any case instituted by complaint or upon information given to a police-officer (I refer to so much only of the section as bears upon the question now before us) a person is accused before a Magistrate of any offence triable by a Magistrate and the Magistrate by whom the case is heard discharges or acquits the accused and is satisfied that the accusation against him was frivolous or vexatious, the Magistrate may, by his order of discharge or acquittal, direct the person on whose complaint or information the accusation was made, to pay to the accused such compensation not exceeding fifty rupees as the Magistrate thinks fit; and it provides that at the time of awarding compensation in any subsequent civil suit relating to the same matter, the Court shall take into account any compensation paid under this section.

4. If then an accusation is "frivolous" or "vexatious," the fact of its being false as well cannot disentitle the accused to compensation u/s 250.

5. As qualifying an accusation, the term frivolous indicates that the accusation is of a trivial nature, but it may or may not be false; and the term vexatious implies that the accusation is one which ought not to have been made in a Criminal Court and which is intended to harass the accused. But neither of the two words excludes the element of falsehood in the charge. Then, again, a charge that is false must also be vexatious, though it may not be frivolous as well. There is, therefore, no reason why a case in which the accusation is false should be considered as being outside the scope of the section. The object of the section is not to punish the complainant, but, by a summary order, to award some compensation to the person against whom a frivolous or vexatious accusation is brought, leaving it to him to obtain further redress against the complainant, if he seeks for it by a regular civil suit or criminal prosecution.

6. In the case of the Queen v. Rupan Rai (1871) 6 B.L.R. 296, it was held that u/s 270 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861 (Act XXV of that year), as amended by Act VIII of 1869 which corresponded to Section 250 of the present Code, the Magistrate was competent to award compensation to the person accused, notwithstanding that he afterwards committed and even if he had then made up his mind to commit, the complainant to take his trial on the charge of giving false evidence. It is true that the provisions of Section 250 of the present Code are, in some respects, different from those of the old Code, hut the difference does not affect the question now before us. The same view is affirmed in the case of Bachu Lal v. Jagdam Sahai ILR (1898) 181, though the order awarding compensation u/s 250 of the Code was set aside on the ground that the Magistrate in making that order had exercised his discretion improperly. In the case of Shib Nath Chong v. Sarat Chunder Sarkar ILR (1895) Cal. 586, there are certain observations in the judgment of this Court which no doubt conflict with the above view; but those observations are in the nature of obiter dicta, as the real ground upon which the order awarding compensation was set aside is given in the following passage of the judgment:

In the present case the Sessions Judge has set aside the sanction to prosecute and we agree in the reasons which he has given in his judgment for so