The central legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the term 'suit for land' within the legal framework of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent and the exercise of judicial discretion in appointing a Receiver.

JUDGMENT

Lancelot Sanderson, C.J. - This is an appeal from the judgment of my learned brother Mr. Justice Greaves whereby he appointed a Receiver in a suit upon an application of the plaintiff Company. The suit was brought by the plaintiff Company praying that the defendant might be ordered and decreed to carry out the agreement referred to in the plaint and to execute and register the conveyance and for a decree for the sum of Rs. 88,280, being the expenses incurred by the. plaintiff Company in carrying on the estate from the 1st January 1920 to the 14th January 1921 and for the sum of Rs. 1,500 per week from the 14th January 1921 until the defendant would take possession of the said estate less the sum which is referred to in the prayer and for the sum of Rs. 7,800, odd as interest or by way of damages, or, in the alternative, in the event of the Court deciding that the plaintiff Company was not entitled to specific performance for damages.

2. It appears that the Company was-carrying on the business of tea planters in Assam and owned and worked an estate in Assam known as the Eraligool Tea Estate. It was alleged in the plaint that the defendant agreed to purchase the estate for Rs. 2,25,000, the purchase to date from the 1st January 1920, the work on the estate until the completion to be carried on by the plaintiff Company which was to be reimbursed by the defendant for all expenditure as from the 1st January 1920. It was agreed by the learned Counsel that the agreement-was made in Calcutta The plaint further alleged that on the 5th August 1920 the Attorneys of the defendant sent to the plaintiff Company's Attorneys a deed of conveyance prepared from a draft which had been accepted by the plaintiff. Company, duly stamped and engrossed and the plaintiff Company approved the said deed and called upon the defendant to complete the same. It was then alleged that in spite of repeated demands, although the defendant admitted his liability to execute the said conveyance, he refused so to do. The plaint set out the amount of money which the plaintiff Company expended in carrying on the work since the 1st January 1920.

3. The written statement, amongst other matters, referred to certain representations, which it was alleged had been made on behalf of the plaintiff Company and which, it was said, induced the defendant to send the conveyance to the plaintiffs' Attorneys and stated that the defendant had never intended to complete the transaction without a satisfactory investigation of title; that the defendant believed that the plaintiff Company was unable to convey about 100 acres of the entire land of the estate and that consequently, by reason of such shortage, the plaintiff Company was not entitled to specific performance or to damages. The main point, which was argued in this Court, was that this Court on its Original Side had no Jurisdiction to try the suit and that consequently, inasmuch, as the learned Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, he had no jurisdiction to appoint a Receiver. The learned Counsel for the defendant argued that the learned Judge ought to have tried an issue as to whether this Court on its Original Side had jurisdiction to entertain the suit, before he decided to appoint a Receiver.

4. We have not the advantage of any judgment of the learned Judge and I cannot ascertain to what extent the learned Judge considered the question whether the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. I agree with the learned Counsel that it would have been more satisfactory, to say the least, if the learned Judge had decided the question whether the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit before he made an order appointing a Receiver. I do not propose, however, to accede to the learned Counsel's application to remand this question to the learned Judge, because, in my judgment, it would be an unnecessary waste of time and money. The matter has been fully argued and at considerable length in this Court by the lear