The main legal point established in the judgment is that the applicability of Hindu law and the impact of Act XV of 1856 on the forfeiture of a widow's estate upon remarriage were central to the court's decision.

JUDGMENT

1. The defendants are the appellants before us and the facts of the suit, out of which this appeal has arisen are, shortly stated, as follows:

The plaintiff is the daughter of one Lalua Singh, who held a six pies share in ,a certain jote. The defendant No. 1, Santala Bewa, is Lalua's second wife. On Lalua's death she inherited the share of Lalua in the said jote. Thereafter the defendant No. 1 married again, according to the custom of the Rajbansis and subsequently she sold the said six pies share in the jote to defendant No. 2, who again sold the same to defendant No. 3. The plaintiff has brought the present suit for recovery of possession of the said six pies share on the ground that the defendant No. 1 by her re-marriage had forfeited her right to the said share and that the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 by their purchase had acquired no right and title to the same. The defendant No. 1 in her defence stated that there was a special custom among the Rajbansis that a widow did not forfeit her right to her husband's property by her re-marriage.

2. The Munsif held that the Rajbansis were not Hindus, and that the parties were governed not by Hindu law, but by custom and that among the Rajbansis a widow could keep a Dangua, and by keeping one she was not divested of her former husband's property. He accordingly held that the defendant No. 1 did not forfeit her first husband's property by her remarriage and accordingly dismissed the suit.

3. The plaintiff appealed to the Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling and the latter held that the special custom referred to it by the Munsif had not been satisfactorily established. It was also held by the learned Deputy Commissioner that the Rajbansis were governed by the ordinary Hindu law and that, therefore, the defendant No. 1 forfeited the estate inherited from her first husband by her re-marriage, and consequently the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 acquired no title to the property in suit by purchase from the defendant No. 1.

4. On behalf of the Appellants it has been contended before us that the lower Appellate Court was wrong in holding that the Rajbansis were governed by the ordinary Hindu law, and, in the second place, that there was a difference between a widow, among the Rajbansis, re-marrying and keeping a Dangua according to the custom which prevails among the Rajbansis, and that the fact of the defendant No. 1, having kept a Dangua did not entail any forfeiture of the interest taken by her in her first husband's estate.

5. As regards the first contention that the Rajbansis are not governed by the ordinary Hindu law reliance has been placed upon the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Phanindra Deb Raikat v. Rajeshwar Das (1885) 11 Cal. 463. The question of acknowledgment and recognition of Non-Hindus as Hindus arose in the following manner in that case. The dispute related to the succession of a zamindari called the Baikantpur Raj, and the question their Lordships had to determine was as to the validity of the adoption of the defendant in that case as a son to the deceased zamindar. It was found that the family of Cooch-Behar, to which the parties belonged, originally belonged to the Cooch-Behar aboriginal tribe, which had abandoned their old customs, called themselves Rajbansi Kshatriyas, adopted Hinduism as their religion and claimed a divine ancestry for their chief, who traced his pedigree to the God Shiva. Upon this, the High Court presumed that the parties were Hindus and cast upon the plaintiff who was a rival claimant, the burden of proving the invalidity of the defendant's adoption.

6. On a review of their family history, their Lordships held that it showed "that although they affected to be Hindus, they had retained and were governed by family customs, which as regards some matters, were at variance with the Hindu law." They therefore held that the family was subject only to customary law and that as no custom in favour of adoption had been proved, the defendant lost his