CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Luchmun Persad & Anr. - Appellant
Versus
Raja Ram Tewary & Ors. - Respondent
Regular Appeals Nos. 228, 240, 241, 249, 252 and 255 of 1865
Decided On : 01-06-1867
Limitation - Property - Act VIII of 1859, Section 8 - The court held that the cause of action for a son to recover ancestral property sold by his father accrued when the purchaser took possession, not upon the father's death. The court reasoned that the son acquired a right in the ancestral property upon birth, and could have sued for partition or to recover his share during the father's lifetime. The court also held that the birth of a younger brother did not create a new cause of action for the son, as the younger brother inherited the estate as it was at his birth and could not dissent from a sale made before his birth.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff, Luchmun Persad, sued to recover possession of certain lands by setting aside deeds of sale executed by his father, Jeetun Lall. The suit was brought against multiple defendants, each having a distinct interest in the property. The deeds included both absolute and conditional sales, and the plaintiff argued that the sales were invalid because they were made without his consent and were not for sufficient cause.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the suit was barred by the Statute of Limitation in respect of the deeds of absolute sale, as more than twelve years had elapsed since the execution of the deeds and the taking of possession by the purchasers. The court held that the cause of action accrued when the purchasers took possession, not upon the death of Jeetun Lall. The court also found that the suit was not barred in respect of the deeds of conditional sale, as the cause of action accrued when possession was taken under the decrees for foreclosure, not from the date of the mortgage deeds or the decrees for foreclosure.
Issues: The main issue in the case was whether the Statute of Limitation barred the plaintiff's suit. Specifically, the court had to determine when the cause of action accrued for the plaintiff to recover the ancestral property sold by his father. The court also had to consider whether the birth of the plaintiff's younger brother created a new cause of action.
Ratio Decidendi: The court applied the Mitakshara law of inheritance, which states that a son acquires a right in ancestral property upon birth, even during his father's lifetime. The court reasoned that the son could have sued for partition or to recover his share during the father's lifetime, and therefore the cause of action accrued when the purchaser took possession, not upon the father's death. The court also held that the birth of a younger brother did not create a new cause of action, as the younger brother inherited the estate as it was at his birth and could not dissent from a sale made before his birth.
Final Decision: The court reversed the decision of the Principal Sudder Ameen in respect of the deeds of absolute sale, holding that the suit was barred by the Statute of Limitation. The court upheld the decision of the Principal Sudder Ameen in respect of the deeds of conditional sale, holding that the suit was not barred. The appeals relating to the deeds of conditional sale were remanded to the Division Bench to determine the other issues.
JUDGMENT
Sir Barnes Peacock, Kt., C.J. - This is a suit brought by Luchmun Persad, the son of Jeetun Lall, on account of himself, and as guardian of his minor brother Radhamohun Persad. The appeal is from a decision of the Principal Sudder Ameen of Sarun. The suit was brought on the 5th October 1863, and is to recover possession of certain lands by reversal of certain deeds, some of those deeds being deeds of absolute sale, and some of conditional sale. I wish to remark, before I enter into the merits of the case, that it is very inconvenient that a suit of this nature should be brought against a number of defendants whose interests are altogether distinct from each other. S. 8, Act VIII of 1859, allows causes of action to be joined in the same suit by and against the same parties. But there is no clause which authorises different causes of action to be joined in one suit against different parties where each of those parties has a distinct and separate interest. In this case the validity of the different deeds depends each upon its own merits. It would be just as reasonable to sue four different defendants on bonds given by each of them, or even to join them with a few other defendants for trespassing on the plaintiff's lands, as it was to join all the defendants in the present suit. Such a joinder in one suit of distinct causes of action against different defendants, each of whom is unconnected with the cause of action against the other, complicates the case before the Judge, and renders it exceedingly difficult for him in dealing with the case of each defendant to exclude from his consideration those portions of the evidence which may not be admissible against him, though admissible against one or more of the others. Moreover, it is vexatious and harassing to the different defendants. Such a procedure renders it almost compulsory on all the defendants to be present, either in person or by their pleaders, whilst the case is going on against the others in respect of matters in which they are not interested; and, moreover, it is harassing and inconvenient as regards the attendance of the witnesses of the several defendants, as it renders it necessary for the witnesses of each to be present and to be detained whilst the case of the others is being heard and determined. Again in appeal each case must be argued as a separate and distinct case. I think, therefore, that the Judges below ought to be more careful, and to reject plaints when brought against several defendants for causes of action which have accrued against each of them separately, and in respect of which they are not jointly concerned.
2. In a case of this nature, which was brought before the Court in the exercise of original jurisdiction, Norman, J., rejected the plaint. An appeal was preferred to a Division Bench, and the decision of Norman, J., was upheld. I observe that, in this very case, one ground of objection was that the suit was informal, because some persona in whose favor deeds had been executed and their heirs were not made co-defendants, and a, distinct issue was raised upon the subject.
3. Having made these remarks, I now proceed with the case with reference to the defendant in Appeal No. 241, which is a separate appeal, although the case is mixed up with others, and forms part of only one action in the Court below. The suit against this defendant is to set aside an absolute deed of sale of ancestral immoveable property executed by the plaintiff's father Jeetun Lall in 1848. Possession was taken by the purchaser at that date, so that more than twelve years from the date of the deed, and the taking of possession under it, had expired when the suit was commenced on the 5th October 1863. Luchmun Persad was born about 1837, and, consequently, more than three years had expired since he became of full age. The Principal Sudder Ameen decided upon the issue of limitation that the suit was not barred, upon the ground that limitation ran from the death of Jeetun Lall
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