The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and applicability of various sections of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act to the execution of a decree, including the authority of the Debt Settlement Board, the definition of debt, and the jurisdiction of civil courts in entertaining applications against debtors under an award.

JUDGMENT

Henderson, J. - This appeal is by the judgment-debtors.spondent obtained a decree in the Small Cause Court, Calcutta, against the appellants' father Sarat Chandra Pal for the price of goods supplied to his business. The decree was transferred to the Court at Alipore, for execution and the immovable property of the judgment-debtor was attached. The usual sort of objections were taken by the present appellants and other relatives but they failed. In the meantime Sarat Chandra Pal applied to a Debt Settlement Board and the execution proceedings were stayed on receipt of a notice u/s 34, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, on 20th April 1989. On 2nd April 1941, the respondent applied to the Court with a prayer that the stay Order be vacated. The judgment-debtor filed what amounts to an objection u/s 47, Civil P.C. to the effect that the execution could not proceed on various grounds. The Munsif allowed the objection and dismissed the execution case. The decree-holder appealed. While the appeal was pending the Board made an award. As the amount of the debt had been decreed by a Court it could not be reduced by the Board without a flagrant violation of the law. It was, however, made payable in 19 instalments. On appeal the learned Subordinate Judge set aside the Munsifs Order and directed execution to proceed. The judgment-debtor appealed to this Court. He died during the pendency of the appeal and his sons have been substituted in his place.

2. When the Munsif dealt with the matter the notice u/s 84 still enjoyed whatever force it ever had. It became spent, however, when the Board made the award while the appeal was pending in the lower appellate Court. The only question for consideration now is whether the respondent is entitled to proceed with his execution case.

3. The liability is undoubtedly a debt under the definition of a debt in Section 2 (8) of the Act. Furthermore, under the provisions of Section20 it is for the Board to determine whether the liability is a debt or not. The Board undoubtedly had jurisdiction to deal with the matter and has made an award by the terms of which the debt is to be paid in 19 annual instalments. Under the provisions of Section 28 in case of default of any instalment it may be recovered as though it were a public demand. u/s 28 (2) the Certificate Officer may allow the judgment-debtor time. It is undoubtedly anomalous if the decree-holder can realise the whole amount in these execution proceedings. But the existence of an anomaly cannot deprive the decree-holder of any right, which he may have under the law.

4. Ordinarily, execution proceedings such as these would be barred under the provisions of Section 35. But, in view of the definition of 'Civil Court' in Section 2 (6A), the decree now under exe. cution is not a decree within the meaning of this section. Mr. Mitter, however, contended that the present proceedings are barred u/s 33.

5. The section lays down that no civil Court shall entertain an application against the debtor in respect of any debt for which any amount is payable under an award except in accordance with the provisions of Sub-section (5) of Section 29. The first question to be considered is whether the Court of the Munsif is a civil Court within the meaning of the section.

6. The learned Subordinate Judge relied upon a decision of mine in Geo Miller and Co. Ltd. Vs. Pabna Motor Service, AIR 1941 Cal 706 . That decision deals with a case u/s 34 of the Act. But I see no reason to suppose that the term 'Civil Court' has a different meaning in Section 33. After further consideration I have reached the conclusion that that decision was wrong for a reason, which was not, then under consideration. The only point then discussed was whether the decree had been passed by a civil Court.

7. A further point, however, arises whether the Court of the Munsif now executing the decree is a Court within the meaning of Section 33. It is undoubtedly a Court within the definition of Section 2 (6A).