CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
S.K. Ghose, J., Nasim Ali, J.
Prafulla Chandra Nag - Appellant
Versus
Jatindra Nath Kar - Respondent
Decided On : 18-02-1938
rebate - construction contract - Section 20, Limitation Act - Kedar Nath Mitra v. Dinabandhu Saha AIR (1916) Cal 580, Mackenzie v. Tiruvengadathan (1886) 9 Mad 271, Marreco v. Richardson (1908) 2 KB 584 - The court discussed the principle of quantum meruit and the entitlement to rebate in a construction contract. It also analyzed the interpretation of Section 20 of the Limitation Act and the legal implications of payment by cheque as an acknowledgment of the debt.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff alleged that he had agreed to construct a house for the defendant at an estimated cost. The defendant contended that the work was unsatisfactory and had to be stopped, and the total dues were settled at a lower amount.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the defendant was not entitled to rebate as claimed and that the payment made by cheque was sufficient compliance with the proviso to Section 20 of the Limitation Act.
Issues: The issues raised included the entitlement to rebate in a construction contract and the compliance with the proviso to Section 20 of the Limitation Act.
Ratio Decidendi: The court found that the appellant was not entitled to rebate as the work was stopped before completion, and the original estimate was set aside. It also held that the payment made by cheque was an acknowledgment of the debt, complying with the proviso to Section 20 of the Limitation Act.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed with costs.
JUDGMENT
S.K. Ghose, J. - This is an appeal under Clause 15, Letters Patent from the judgment of my learned brother Henderson J. The relevant facts are these: The plaintiff brought a suit alleging that he had agreed to construct a house for the defendant according to an estimated cost of Rs. 7555 less the sum of Rs. 555 claming Rs. 1776 as the amount due. The defendant con. tended that on account of the work being unsatisfactory, it had to be stopped after a certain time, that the total dues were settled at Rs. 4878 minus a rebate of Rs. 359 proportionate to the rebate of Rs. 555 upon the original estimate of Rs. 7555, that he made certain payments and that only Rs. 31 was due from him except with regard to some scaffolding materials. The Munsif decreed the suit at Rs. 531. On appeal by the defendant the Subordinate Judge reduced the figure to Rs. 480. The defendant again appealed to the High Court. Our learned brother Henderson J. agreed with the Subordinate Judge but allowed further appeal. Hence this Letters Patent Appeal by the defendant.
2. In this appeal two questions are raised. The first is that the defendant appellant is entitled to rebate as claimed by him proportionate to the rebate of Rs. 555 upon the original estimate. This argument is sought to be supported upon the principle of quantum meruit but really what the appellant asks us to do is to make a new contract for the parties. Henderson J. pointed out that the appellant himself put an end to the work before it was concluded, the original estimate of the plaintiff was set aside and the suit is for the work actually done. Therefore there can be no question of rebate on the basis of the original estimate. The point therefore fails.
3. The next point is that of limitation. The defendant's case is that he made a payment of Rs. 300 upon the settled account arrived at on the intervention of an Engineer, Mr. B. Dhar. This payment was made by two cheques which were given to the plaintiff by the defendant on 28th January 1929. Prom the date of that payment the present suit was instituted within three years. Henderson J. held that there was sufficient compliance with the proviso to Section 20, Limitation Act. This finding is challenged in this appeal. Now it is admitted that the payment of Rs. 300 was made by-two cheques as aforesaid and also that this payment was towards the plaintiff's claim and not on any other account. The question is whether the cheques are to be held to be acknowledgment of the payment in the handwriting of the appellant. The first point is whether the cheques are payments at all. This point was settled by the judgment of Sir Lawrence Jenkins C.J. in Kedar Nath Mitra v. Dinabandhu Saha AIR (1916) Cal 580. There, a cheque was delivered to a payee by way of payment and was received by him as such. Jenkins C. J. pointed out that "there was no suggestion in that case that the cheque upon presentation was not paid and in fact it was." Upon these facts it was held that the cheque operates as a payment subject to the condition subsequent that if upon due presentation the cheque is not paid the original debt revives. Then he said:
If I am right in the view that the cheque actually was a payment, the very payment was in the handwriting of the person making the same.
4. No doubt this was with reference to the old Act; while now by the amendment of 1927 it is not "the fact of the payment" appearing in the handwriting of the person making the payment but "an acknowledgment of the payment" appearing in the same handwriting that has got to be proved. So far as this question is concerned, it seems to me that, although the fact of payment may be different from the acknowledgment, if the cheque itself is evidence of the fact of payment it is also evidence of acknowledgment. It has been contended that acknowledgment must necessarily follow the payment. I do not see why the two may not be simultaneous. If we take the acknowledgment to mean admission (the ordinary dictionar
AI
The main legal point established in the judgment is the binding effect of the settlement between the parties, the waiver of the right to seek re-employment by the workmen, and the entitlement of the ....
A lockout is justified if it is declared in response to an illegal strike or a strike that is in breach of a settlement or award.
The combination of eyewitness testimonies, recovery of the weapon used, and forensic examination results can establish guilt in criminal cases, even based on circumstantial evidence.
The conviction of an accused person under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act is not permissible in law if the accused is also charged with committing murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
The court can enhance compensation based on the deceased's income and family dependency, and adjust the multiplier used by the Tribunal if found unjustified.
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.