1946 Supreme(Cal) 104
CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Sharpe, J.
Muhammad Kazim Ali & Anr. - Appellant
Versus
Ramesh Chandra Sil - Respondent
Decided On : 31-07-1946
The judgment establishes the interpretation of the definition of 'suit to which this Act applies' in Section 2(22) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act and the application of mandatory provisions in ordering restoration of mortgaged property under Section 36(2).
Headnote:
Mortgage Suit - Bengal Money-Lenders Act - Section 36(1), Section 36(2), Section 2(22) - The judgment discusses the reopening of a mortgage decree under the Bengal Money-Lenders Act and the interpretation of the definition of 'suit to which this Act applies' in Section 2(22). The court analyzes the mandatory provisions of Section 36(2) and the conflict with proviso (ii) of Section 36(1) in the context of ordering restoration of the mortgaged property. The judgment also considers the applicability of the Act to a title suit for possession and the distinction between pending suits and new proceedings.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiffs executed a mortgage bond, and the mortgagee obtained a decree for the property. Subsequently, the mortgagors applied for reopening the decree under Section 36, Bengal Money-Lenders Act.
Finding of the Court:
The Court upheld the decision of the trial Court regarding the refusal to order restoration of the mortgaged property and dismissed the appeal. The Court also granted leave to appeal under Clause 15, Letters Patent.
Issues: The main issues revolved around the interpretation of the definition of 'suit to which this Act applies' in Section 2(22) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act and the mandatory provisions of Section 36(2) in ordering restoration of the mortgaged property.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court held that the reopening of the mortgage decree involves the opening of both the preliminary and final decrees. It also emphasized the distinction between pending suits and new proceedings in the context of the Act's applicability.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal under Clause 15, Letters Patent was granted.
JUDGMENT
Sharpe, J. - The appellants are the plaintiffs, judgment-debtors, and the facts are not disputed. On 12-4-1930 the plaintiffs executed a mortgage bond for Rs. 600 in favour of the respondent, interest being at 20 per cent, per annum. The mortgagee sued on the bond and obtained a preliminary decree for Rs. 1200 on 17-11-1936. The decree was made final on 21-12-1936. The mortgaged property which comprised the land of seven schedules was put up to sale and purchased by the decree, holder for Rs. 500. The sale was confirmed on 16-9-1937 and delivery of possession was taken through Court on 30-9-1937. The decree-holder did not however succeed in obtaining actual possession and in 1938 he instituted Title suit No. 116A/38 for a declaration of his title and for khas possession. He obtained a decree for the entire property in the trial Court. In appeal, the suit was withdrawn in respect of the property contained in Schedule 4, but the decree of the trial Court was confirmed on 15-9-1939 in respect of the remaining six schedules of property.
2. On 9-9-1940, the mortgagors applied u/s 36, Bengal Money-Lenders Act, for reopening of the decree in the mortgage suit. The application was allowed by the trial Court who assessed the dues recoverable under the mortgage at Rs. 1200-15-3. In view, however, of the provisions of proviso (ii) of Section 36(1), Bengal Money-Lenders Act, he held that he could not interfere with the decree which had been passed in Title Suit No. 116A/38, and consequently that he could not make a direction under Sub-section (c) of Section 36(2) of the Act for the restoration to the mortgagors, judgment-debtors, of the entire mortgaged property, but only in respect of Schedule 4 property which was valued at Rs. 200. He, therefore, passed a new decree for the sum of Rs. 600-15-3 (i.e. Rs. 1200-15-3 less Rs. 600 realised by the sale of the remaining six schedules of property) and directed that the judgment-debtors would be allowed to pay this amount by annual instalments of Rs. 50 each.
3. The judgment-debtors appealed and there was a cross, objection by the decree-holder respondent. The appeal related to the refusal of the trial Court to order restoration of the entire mortgaged property; the cross-objection mainly to the contention that there was no justification for reopening the decree, but the grounds on which this objection was made were grounds which have not been advanced at the hearing in this Court. The cross-objection was disallowed so far as it related to the contention that the decree could not be reopened, but allowed in respect of the claim that interest should have been allowed from the date of the suit to the date of the new decree, an amount which was found to be Rs. 185-6-6. The appeal was dismissed and the decision of the trial Court upheld in regard to the refusal to order restoration of the land of the six schedules of property of which the decree-holder had obtained a decree for khas possession. The judgment-debtors have now appealed and there is again a cross-objection by the decree-holder. The point urged in the appeal is that the Courts below have erred in not ordering restoration of the entire mortgaged property and the objection of the respondent is that the Courts below were wrong in reopening the decree.
4. It seems desirable to deal first with the cross-objection. For the appellant, it has been contended that the decree which was reopened was a decree "in a suit to which this Act applies" within the meaning of those words in Section 36(1), Bengal Money-Lenders Act, and the definition of "suit to which this Act applies" contained in Section 2(22) of that Act. Reliance has been placed on the decision of Sk. Ajarddi v. Sm. Sonai Bibi 33 AIR 1946 Cal. 65 in which it has been held that a mortgage suit remains pending, even after the preliminary and final decrees have been passed and sale held in execution of the final decree, as long as an application for a personal decree can legally be made