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1943 Supreme(Cal) 86
CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Rau, J., Mukherjea, J.
Calcutta Landing and Shipping Co. Ltd. - Appellant
Versus
Victor Oil Company Ltd. - Respondent
Decided On : 13-07-1943
The absence of a registered instrument rendered the verbal agreement ineffective, and the notice to quit was invalid under Section 106, T. P. Act.
Headnote:
Lease - Validity of Notice - Sections 106, 110, T. P. Act - Summary of Acts and Sections: Sections 106 and 110, T. P. Act - The court discussed the interpretation of Section 110 and its applicability to written and oral leases. The court also highlighted the requirement for a registered instrument for creating a lease and the implications of the absence of such an instrument. The court emphasized the technical rules of interpretation and the determination of the commencement of tenancy.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff sought ejectment and mesne profits from the defendant, claiming a verbal agreement for a 3-year lease of a godown. The defendant went into possession but no written lease was executed. The plaintiff served a notice to quit, which was deemed invalid under Section 106, T. P. Act.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the absence of a registered instrument rendered the verbal agreement ineffective. The notice to quit was held invalid under Section 106, T. P. Act, due to the absence of a valid lease.
Issues: Validity of notice under Sections 106 and 110, T. P. Act, applicability of Section 110 to written and oral leases, and the requirement for a registered instrument for creating a lease.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the absence of a registered instrument rendered the verbal agreement ineffective, and the notice to quit was invalid under Section 106, T. P. Act. The court also discussed the interpretation of Section 110 and its applicability to written and oral leases.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed, and the parties were directed to bear their own costs throughout.
JUDGMENT
Rau, J. - This appeal is by the plaintiffs, the Calcutta Landing and Shipping Co. Ltd., in a suit for ejectment and mesne profits brought against the respondents, the Victor Oil Co., Ltd. The facts are briefly these: There was a verbal agreement between the parties to the effect that the defendant company would take a lease of the disputed godown for a period of 3 years "from 1st June 1936" on a monthly rent of Rs. 250. The defendant company went into possession on 1st June 1936 and has been in possession ever since. A written lease had been contemplated but none was actually executed. On 13th November 1940, the plaintiff company served a notice upon the defendants to give up possession of the premises "on the expiry of 1st December 1940." Both the Courts below have held that this "was not a valid notice u/s 106, T. P. Act. Hence this second appeal. The sole question raised before us is as to the validity of the notice. The sections to be considered are Sections 106 and 110, T. P. Act. The relevant portions of these sections run thus:
Section 106.-In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee by six months notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy, and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee by fifteen days notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy.
Section 110.-Where the time limited by a lease of immovable property is expressed as commencing from a particular day, in computing that time such day shall be excluded. Where no day of commencement is named the time so limited begins from the making of the lease.
Where the time so limited is a year or a number of years, in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary the lease shall last during the whole anniversary of the day from which such time commences.
Where the time so limited is expressed to be terminable before its expiration and the lease omits to mention at whose option it is so terminable, the lessee and not the lessor shall have such option.
2. Both the Courts below have held that Section 110 has no application except to a written lease. I shall first comment on this point. u/s 107, T. P. Act, a lease of immovable property can in certain cases be made only by a registered instrument but in all other cases leases may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. Ordinarily therefore the word "expressed" in Section 110 would seem to mean "expressed" either in the registered instrument or in the oral agreement by which the lease is made. I am not quite convinced that the word "expressed" necessarily implies expression in writing. For example, Section 7 (2), Contract Act, indicates that in Order to con-vert a proposal into a promise the acceptance must be "expressed" in some usual and reasonable manner; clearly this applies to verbal as well as written acceptances. By way of contrast, I may notice Section 25 (1) of the same Act which provides that an agreement made without consideration is void unless it is expressed in writing and registered under the law for the time being in force. Thus, where the Legislature means expression in writing, it may be expected to say so in plain terms. Nor am I quite convinced that the last paragraph of Section 110 which speaks of the lease omitting to mention at whose option it is terminable necessarily implies that the section contemplates a written lease. An oral agreement may omit to mention a thing just as much as a written instrument. On the language of Section 110 it is not therefore clear to me that it cannot apply to a lease created by oral agreement as well as to one created by a registered instruments The provision is really in the nature of
