JUDGMENT

Mookerjee and Carnduff, JJ. - The plaintiffs, appellants, are tradesmen in the town of Mozaffarpur and are dealers in cloth, gold, pearls, jewellery and other articles. The defendant is a zemindar resident in the same place and is admittedly a person of position and considerable income. The plaintiffs commenced this action for recovery of approximately Us. 2,300 from the defendant, for goods supplied during a period of more than two years from the 14th January 1902 to 18th October 1904. The defendant, who at the time of the institution of the suit was an infant under the guardianship of a certificated guardian, resisted the claim substantially on two grounds, namely, first, that the transactions mentioned in the plaint were entirely fictitious, and secondly, that as at the dates of the alleged transactions, he was an infant, he was not liable to pay for the goods. The Courts below have found concurrently upon the first question in favour of the plaintiffs, and have held upon the evidence that the purchases were made from them for the benefit of the defendant. Upon the second question, they have held that the articles supplied could not be regarded as necessary expenses, and therefore the plaintiffs were not entitled to their value. The plaintiffs have now appealed to this Court, and on their behalf the decision of the District Judge has been assailed substantially on two grounds, namely, first, that at the time of the transactions the defendant was not an infant, inasmuch as the first certificated guardian had been discharged, and, secondly, that even if he be regarded in the eye of law as an infant, the articles supplied were necessaries for which the plaintiffs were entitled to be paid.

2. In support of the first ground urged on behalf of the appellants, it has been pointed out that the defendant was born on the 8th November 1885, that one Bisun Deo was appointed his guardian under the Guardians and Wards Act of 1890 on the 20th November 1901, that on the 28th April 1903 Bisun Deo, upon his own application and with the assent of the present defendant, was discharged from the guardianship, and that it was not till the 8th September 1905 that Chhatradhari, the present guardian, was appointed by the District Judge under Act VIII of 1890. On these facts, which are not disputed, it has been contended on behalf of the appellants that the defendant attained his majority on the 8th November 1903 and not on the 8th November 1906, and that consequently the appointment of the second guardian on the 8th September 1905 was ultra vires. In support of this position, reliance has been placed upon the cases of Patesri v. Champa Lal (1891) 11 All. W.N. 118, Yeknath v. Warubai ILR (1888) 13 Bom. 285 and Birj Molian v. Rudra Perhash ILR (1880) Cal 944. On behalf of the respondent, it has been argued on the other hand that if a guardian be once appointed or declared, the disability of the minor continues until the attainment of 21 years of age, although the guardian may die, be removed or otherwise cease to act, and in support of this proposition reliance has been placed upon the cases Rudra Prokash v. Bhola Nath ILR (1886) Cal 612 Khwahish v. Surju Prasad (1881) ILR 3 All. 598 and Gordhandas v. Harivalubhdas I.L.R.(1896) 21 Bom. 281. In our opinion the contention of the appellants is clearly opposed to the plain language of Section 3 of the Indian Majority Act of 1875, as amended by Section 52 of the Gaurdians and Wards Act of 1890. Section 3 provides that every minor of whose person or property or both, a guardian other than a guardian for a suit has been or shall be appointed or declared by any Court of Justice before the minor has attained the age of 18 years, and every minor of whose property the superintendence has been or shall be assumed by any Court of Wards before the minor has attained that age, shall be deemed to have attained his majority when he shall have completed his age of 21 years and not before. The language of this se