JUDGMENT

W. Comer Petheram, Kt., C.J. - These rules arise out of an application made by the proprietor of a mouza, u/s 84 of the Tenancy Act, to acquire by compulsory sale a small piece of land made up of parts of several raiyati holdings within his estate. The application was opposed, and the matter has been brought before this Court by the proprietors of an indigo factory, who have taken under leases the greater part of the lands of the village, including the holdings within which this small plot of land is comprised, from the raiyats.

2. The applicant is the zemindar of the mouza, and has himself constructed an indigo factory in the mouza, and has employed a European manager for it and his estate; and the present contest is not between the zemindar and the raiyats in the ordinary sense of the words, but is one between the European managers of rival indigo factories. The Collector of the district granted to the applicant a certificate u/s 84, that the purpose for which the land was required was reasonable and sufficient, and thereupon application was made to the Munsif under that section, to acquire the land compulsorily, The Munsif tried the matter as a disputed question of fact, came to the conclusion that the purpose alleged was not reasonable and sufficient, and declined to authorize the purchase under the section. The applicant appealed to the District Judge, who reversed the finding of the Munsif, and made an order authorizing the compulsory acquisition of the land.

3. The first of those rules was obtained by the owners of the indigo factory, u/s 622 of the Code, to set aside the order of the District Judge, on the ground that no appeal lay from the order of the Munsif under the Tenancy Act. The second was obtained by the owner of the mouza, to set aside the order of the Munsif, refusing to allow the compulsory acquisition of the land, on the ground, amongst others, that the Collector was, under the section, the proper authority to decide whether or not the alleged purpose was reasonable and sufficient, and that his certificate was on the hearing before the Civil Court conclusive evidence that it was so. I am of opinion that both rules should be made absolute. It has not been seriously argued before us that any appeal lay from the order of the Munsif to the District Judge; no section of the Act has been pointed out to us giving such appeal, and as there is no right of appeal, the order of the District Judge was without jurisdiction, and must be set aside on revision. The decision of the second rule depends on the construction to be placed on the section itself. It is said in support of the Munsif's judgment that the meaning of it is that before proceedings can be instituted in the Civil Court at all, the certificate of the Collector must be obtained, but that when the matter comes before the Civil Court, the whole question is at large, and that at most the certificate is evidence that the purpose is reasonable and sufficient, and that the Civil Court may accept that view or refuse to do so as it pleases; the second paragraph of the section is relied on, and it is argued that, as the words "having relation to the good of the holding or of the estate in which it is comprised, including the use of the ground as building ground or for any other religious, educational or charitable purpose," appear in the second paragraph, and do not appear in the third, it is apparent that the question upon which the Munsif must be satisfied, before granting the application, is different from that which the Collector must determine, before granting the certificate. And it was further argued that the report of the Select Committee, which will be found quoted in K.N. Roy's edition of the Tenancy Act, p. 330 shows that the Committee, at all events, intended that the certificate of the Collector was only to guard the interests of the raiyats, and not to control the discretion of the Civil Court.

4. As to the second argument, I can only say that if