JUDGMENT

Sir R. Couch, Kt., C.J. - This was an appeal from the award of Mr. Beaufort, the Judge appointed by the Government of Bengal under the Land Acquisition Act, 1870, for the town of Calcutta, and the question to be first determined is whether the appeal lies to this Court. The Act says in s. 3 that "the expression 'Court,'" which is found in a subsequent section where the Collector is directed to refer the matter to the Court, "means, in the Regulation Provinces, British Burmah, and Sindh, a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction." In these the town of Calcutta must be included; otherwise there would be no provision in the Act for any reference in cases within Calcutta. The principal Court of original jurisdiction here is the High Court, and, if there were no other provision in the Act, it would have seemed that the compensation would have to be awarded by this Court. But the Act says that the expression "Court" means a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, "unless when the local Government has appointed (as it is hereby empowered to do), either specially for any case, or generally within any specified local limits, a judicial officer to perform the functions of a Judge under this Act, and then the expression 'Court' means the Court of such officer." This has been done here, and Mr. Beaufort has been appointed. The appeal is given by s. 35, which says, "if the Judge differs from both the assessors as to the amount of compensation, he shall pronounce his decision, and the Collector or the person interested (as the case may be) may appeal therefrom to the Court of the District Judge, unless the Judge whose decision is appealed from is the District Judge, or unless the amount which the Judge proposes to award exceeds Rs. 5,000, in either of which cases the appeal shall lie to the High Court."

2. Before considering what is the construction of this section, I quote the language of Mr. Justice Blackburn in giving his opinion to the house of Lords in The Eastern Counties and the London and Blackwall Railway Companies v. Marriage 9 H.L.C., 32, at p. 36, which was a case depending on the construction of the provisions of an Act of Parliament in which there was a great difference of opinion. The learned Judge says:--"We are bound to look at the language used in the Act, construing it with reference to the object with respect to which the Legislature has used that language, but construing it in its ordinary grammatical sense unless there is something in the subject-matter or the context to show that it is to be understood in some other sense, and doing all this we are to say what is the intention of the Legislature expressed by that language."

3. Now it appears to me that the object of s. 35 was to give an appeal in all cases from the decision of the Court which assessed the compensation; and looking at the definition or statement of the meaning of "Court" in the 3rd section, with the words of s. 35, if there was an assessment of compensation in Calcutta by the High Court on the original side, there would be an appeal from that in the same manner as from a judgment of the High Court on the original side in a suit. And if the local Government substitute for the High Court, a Judge specially appointed as Mr. Beaufort was, it appears to me that it was not intended that his decision in a case in Calcutta should be final, whilst his decision in a similar case outside Calcutta would be subject to appeal. The object of the section was that there should be an appeal, and bearing this in mind we must read the words of s. 35 "may appeal therefrom to the Court of the District Judge," not literally but as meaning the Court which is the Appellate Court of the district. By "District Judge" is meant the Appellate Court of the district which the District Judge's Court is. It would not be right to read those words in their ordinary grammatical sense. They should be read with reference to the object of the section and as meaning the C