1928 Supreme(Cal) 164
CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Rankin, C.J, C.C. Ghose, J.
Bepin Chandra Mandal & Ors. - Appellant
Versus
Emperor - Respondent
Decided On : 13-03-1928
The judgment emphasizes the importance of respecting the jury's decision on questions of fact and the limited grounds for interference in such matters.
Headnote:
201 - Criminal Conspiracy - I.P.C. - [201] - The judgment discusses the trial of six appellants on a charge under section 201 of the Indian Penal Code. The court accepted the majority verdict of the jury and convicted the appellants based on the evidence presented, including witness testimonies and the circumstances of the case. The judge's decision to accept the majority verdict was upheld, and the appeal was dismissed.
Fact of the Case:
The case involved the trial of six appellants on a charge under section 201 of the Indian Penal Code. The jury found them guilty, and the judge accepted the majority verdict, leading to the conviction of the appellants.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the judge's decision to accept the majority verdict of the jury and convict the appellants was appropriate based on the evidence presented during the trial.
Issues: The main issue was whether the judge's acceptance of the majority verdict and subsequent conviction of the appellants was justified based on the evidence and the jury's decision.
Ratio Decidendi: The court upheld the judge's decision to accept the majority verdict and convict the appellants, emphasizing the limited grounds for interference in such matters and the importance of the jury's role in deciding questions of fact.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to surrender to their bail and serve out the remainder of their sentences.
JUDGMENT
Rankin, C.J. - In this case six appellants were tried on a charge u/s 201, I.P.C. before the Additional Sessions Judge of the 24-Pargannas sitting with a jury. The jury by a majority of 4 to 3 found them guilty and the learned Judge accepted the majority verdict of the jury and convicted the appellants and sentenced them to four years' rigorous imprisonment each. He stated in his order:
While this is a case in which there are certain doubtful factors I hesitate not to accept the majority verdict of the jury as this is the second time the accused have been tried by a special jury and a second time a verdict of guilty has been returned by the majority. It was essentially a case in which the jury must decide and I therefore accept their decision while not agreeing with it. I shall be glad if the accused get relief in the appellate Court.
2. Now, the general character of the case was this that one Chintamoni left his home to go to Maibibirhat and never returned. His dead body was found in a tank which may be called Nibaran's tank. There is evidence of a witness who says that he saw the accused with the body near a tank called Suren's tank. This witness is called Parameawar. He says that he confronted the six accused with the body of Chintamoni on the bank of the tank. They first of all told him to get away and then called him back and threatened him. There is evidence of two other witnesses, one called Adyait and another called Kansari, who were coming from a place called Dharmacharak at Panapukar, and as they crossed a bheri west of Nibaran's tank they say they saw these six accused with the dead body. They appear to have been dragging the dead body, but the witnesses' evidence as to seeing the actual dragging is not very definite.
3. The learned Judge put the case to the jury quite fairly, without laying undue stress either way. He left them to consider whether upon this evidence they were entitled to find that the accused were taking the dead body there. He left to them very fairly and properly the evidence on either side as to whether it was proved that Chintamoni had been murdered and whether it was possible that Chintamoni had been drowned by accident. He told them that unless they were satisfied as to the commission of the offence of murder they could not on a charge u/s 201 go any further.
4. If one looks to the charge as a whole one finds, and indeed Mr. Taluqdar for the appellants very fairly says and admits, that the charge is a fair one. It contains no error of law and cannot be said to be inadequate. It is noticeable that the learned Judge has called the attention of the jury to the fact that the important witnesses did not state what they had seen until after a substantial delay, that they have an explanation that they were threatened and that they were afraid, and that the case, therefore, was essentially a case which the jury had to determine on the facts. The learned Judge appears to have been of opinion that sitting as a juryman he would not have been prepared to act upon the evidence taken as a whole but would have given the prisoners the benefit of the doubt. Three of the jury took this view and four of the jury took the view that they were prepared to act upon the evidence, in particular, the definite evidence of these three men. Our right to interfere in such a matter is limited to a case where there has been misdirection on a point of law or where we are satisfied that the jury must have misunderstood the Judge's direction upon a point of law; and this case cannot be brought under either of these characters.
5. The question then arises as to the propriety of the order made by the learned Judge. His view is that it is a fair question for the jury. If he had been a juryman, he would have been in favour of a verdict of not guilty, but he said that he accepted the majority verdict of the jury, and while his reasons about this being a second trial may not have very much in them the position is that he accepted