JUDGMENT

1. In this case a Hindu widow, shortly before her death, transferred a Government promissory-note to the defendant, her brother's son, by means of a registered deed of gift, and the finding is that she was competent to dispose of the note as it was part of her stridhan. The plaintiffs, who are her heirs, have attacked the transfer as invalid and sought to recover the note or its value, with the interest accrued, from the defendant. The Court of first instance held that, in the absence of endorsement and delivery, there was no valid transfer and it decreed the suit. The lower Appellate Court appears to have held that the note could have been validly transferred without endorsement by delivery of possession with intent to transfer; but it affirmed the decree on the ground that, although possession had been delivered at the time of registration, the lady did not intend to part with the property in the instrument.

2. The appeal to this Court raises two points of law. The first is as to whether a negotiable instrument such as this Government Promissory-note can be transferred at all save by endorsement and delivery of possession, as contemplated by the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The answer to this question must, we think, be in the affirmative. No doubt, Sections 46 and 43 of the special Act referred to provide that a negotiable instrument payable to order may be transferred by endorsement and delivery, and it is clear that the privileges of a "holder" secured to the transferee by that Act can be obtained only in the way prescribed by if. Bat the Negotiable Instruments Act of 18S1, like the Bills of Excharge Act, 1832, (45 and 46 Vict. C. 61), deals entirely with transfer by negotiation, that is to say, with transfer according to the law merchant; and, as pointed out in Chalmers on Bills of Exchange 237, at p. 239, it leaves untouched the rules of the general law which regulate the transmission of negotiable instruments and their transfer as chattels. The transferee under the general law would, of course, not be in the privileged position of a "holder" under the special Act, but would be merely in the position of the transferee of any ordinary chattel and have no better title than his transferor. But he would have a good title to the property, if his transferor had such a title, and this has been recognised in several cases in England. Thus, it was held in In re Barrington and Burton 2 Sch. and Lef. 112 : 9 R.R. 61 , that the holder of a note payable to order might transfer his title to another by a separate writing assigning it to the latter; and in Veal v. Veal 27 Beav. 303 : 29 L.J. Ch 321 : 6 fur. (N.S.) 7 : 2 L.T. 228 : 8 W.R. 2 it was decided that the holder of such a note could pass the title by giving it to another in contemplation of death. In the case of a transfer for value without endorsement, the transferee would, in Eagland, u/s 30(4) of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, be able to require the transferor or his representative to complete the transfer by endorsement; and elsewhere a Court of equity would doubtless compass the same end. In the case of a voluntary transfer, it is difficult to say what the exact position of the transferee would be, and it was observed by Sir Mackenzie Chalmers--see p. 144 of the work cited already--that the law requires re-consideration. But with that problem we are not here concerned, and we think that we need not consider further how a voluntary transferee could, for practical purposes, enforce recognition of his title and payment of the note. But that he is entitled to the piece of paper and to the property referred to in it, seems clear; and this is the view taken by the Madras High Court in Muthar Sahib Maraikar v. Kadir Sahib Maraikar 28 M. 544 : 15 M.L.T. 384 and, also, as it seems tous, in Whistler v. Forster 14 C.B. (N.S.) 248 : 8 L.T. 317 : 32 L.J. C.P. 161 : 11 W.R.648 . We are disposed to hold, then, that, if the note in this case was transferred in accordance wit