1934 Supreme(Cal) 191
CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Kedar Mull Agarwalla & Anr. - Appellant
Versus
Wazifunnessa & Anr. - Respondent
Decided On : 18-07-1934
The main legal point established in the judgment is that even if substituted service is considered as personal service, the defendant can later challenge the validity of the service.
Headnote:
Substituted Service - Jurisdiction - Article 164, Limitation Act - Order 5, Rule 20, Civil P.C - 1928 Mad 815, 1931 All 727, 1931 Mad 813 - The court discussed the validity of substituted service and its implications under Order 5, Rule 20, Civil P.C. It referenced case law to establish that even if the substituted service is considered as personal service, the defendant can later challenge the validity of the service. The court held that the learned Judge was justified in entering into the merits of the application despite the order for substituted service, as the service was not due. The court also considered the limitation period for setting aside the ex parte decree.
Fact of the Case:
The court addressed an order allowing an application for setting aside an ex parte decree, based on the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge to go into further enquiries regarding the date of knowledge of the passing of the ex-parte decree.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the substituted service was not due and that the application for setting aside the ex parte decree was not barred by limitation. It concluded that there had been no failure of justice in the case and discharged the rule with costs.
Issues: Jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge, Validity of Substituted Service, Limitation Period for Setting Aside Ex Parte Decree
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that even if the substituted service is considered as personal service, the defendant can later challenge the validity of the service. It also considered the limitation period for setting aside the ex parte decree and found that the application was not barred by limitation.
Final Decision: The court discharged the rule with costs, finding that there had been no failure of justice in the case.
ORDER
1. This rule is directed against an order of the Subordinate Judge of Darjeeling, dated 8th June 1933, allowing an application of the opposite parties 1 and 2 for setting aside an ex parte decree passed against them Under Order 9, Rule 13, Civil P.C.
2. The rule was issued on only one ground, namely, that the Subordinate Judge wrongly assumed jurisdiction to go into further enquiries as to the date of knowledge of the passing of the ex-parte decree, in view of the fact that the substituted service was due service according to law under Article 164, Limitation Act, and the period of limitation commenced to run from the date of the service. It appears from the order sheet of the learned Subordinate Judge in the suit that on 8th September 1931 the Court recorded the following order:
Summons not properly served. Plaintiffs' advocate asks for summons Under Order 5, Rule 20. Issue summons accordingly. Fix 20th September 1931.
3. On 20th September 1931, the following order was recorded:
Defendants are absent. Summons have been served on them Under Order 5, Rule 20. Two witnesses have been examined on behalf of the plaintiff. Affidavit has also been filed recording service of notice on defendants. Suit is decreed ex parte.
4. Under Order 5, Rule 20, Civil P.C, substituted service by order of the Court shall be as effectual as if it had been made on the defendants personally. It was contended by the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners that the learned Subordinate Judge was wrong in holding that the substituted service was not due service within the meaning of Article 164, Limitation Act. In support of this contention reliance was placed upon a decision of the Madras High Court in Shariba Beeby v. Abdul Salam 1928 Mad 815. But in Ram Bharosa v. Ganga Singh 1931 All 727 it has been laid down by the Allahabad High Court that even though the Court records an order to the effect that substituted service has been effected the proceedings at that stage being ex parte, it would be open to the defendant when he appears later to show that the order was not a proper order and that the method employed was not calculated to effect the purpose of informing the defendant of the institution of the suit. Again in the case of Gyanammal v. Abdul Hussain Sahib 1931 Mad 813, Reilly, J., observed as follows:
There are several methods of service provided. The first and the best method of service is personal service on the defendant himself ; and in the class of personal service we may include service on the defendant's agent or the manager of his business or a male member of his family residing with him. All that comes within the class of personal service because it may reasonably be inferred and it is inferable under the rules, that, if a summons is served upon a defendant's agent or the manager of his business or a male member of his family living with him, it comes to the defendant's knowledge. Obviously the best method of service is upon the defendant himself. But, even if the summons is returned to the Court as having been served on the defendant himself, and he does not appear at the trial of the suit, he is not necessarily concluded. We cannot in all oases say that because the return is that the summons has been served personally, it has been duly served and so he cannot get an ex parte decree against him set aside. It is open to a defendant in such circumstances to show that the summons in the suit was not really served upon him, but upon somebody else, or that what was served upon him was not the summons in the suit, or that it did not give the correct date or some other essential information about the suit, or that, it was not, accompanied by a copy of the plaint in the suit concerned, so that although in a sense he was personally served, he was not provided with the knowledge of the claim against him which is the object of the service.
5. It is clear therefore that even though the substituted service may be considered as personal service