CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Trevelyan, J., Beverley, J.
Gobind Lall Chowdhry - Appellant
Versus
Inderdawan Pershad through Mussammat Man Koer and Najmuddin Hossein and Mussummat Bibi Ulfat - Respondent
Decided On : 23-04-1896
Mortgage - Marshalling of Securities - Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Section 81 - Registration as Notice - Subsequent Notice - Whether Right to Marshalling Lost - [Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Sections 3, 81] - The court held that registration of a mortgage does not constitute notice within the meaning of Section 81 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and that a subsequent notice of the prior mortgage does not extinguish the right to marshalling of securities. The court further held that the intention of the parties is crucial in determining whether a subsequent mortgage satisfies the claims for interest under a prior mortgage.
Fact of the Case:
The first defendant mortgaged a property to the plaintiff in 1886. Subsequently, the first defendant mortgaged the same property to the father of the second defendant in 1886, without notice of the first mortgage except for its registration. The second defendant's father obtained a mortgage decree against the first defendant in 1887. In 1889, the first defendant executed another bond to the plaintiff, securing the interest due under the first mortgage and a further loan, and mortgaged the same property again. The property subject to the second mortgage was sold to the second defendant in 1891, with notice of the plaintiff's claim under the first mortgage. The plaintiff filed a suit in 1893 to enforce payment of the money due under the first mortgage.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the interest due under the first mortgage was not satisfied by the subsequent mortgage, as the intention of the parties was not to extinguish the earlier security. The court also found that registration of a mortgage does not constitute notice within the meaning of Section 81 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and that a subsequent notice of the prior mortgage does not extinguish the right to marshalling of securities. Therefore, the second defendant was entitled to insist upon the plaintiff marshalling his securities.
Issues: 1. Whether the subsequent mortgage to the plaintiff satisfied the claims for interest under the first mortgage. 2. Whether the second defendant was entitled to require the plaintiff to sell first those of the mortgaged properties which were not covered by the mortgage to the second defendant under Section 81 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 3. Whether the right to marshalling was lost to the second defendant due to the notice of the earlier mortgage given at the time of the sale.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the intention of the parties is crucial in determining whether a subsequent mortgage satisfies the claims for interest under a prior mortgage. The court also held that registration of a mortgage does not constitute notice within the meaning of Section 81 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and that a subsequent notice of the prior mortgage does not extinguish the right to marshalling of securities. The court reasoned that the right to marshalling is a right acquired by the mortgagee at the time of the mortgage and is not extinguished by a subsequent notice.
Final Decision: The court held that the second defendant was entitled to insist upon the plaintiff marshalling his securities and that the plaintiff must sell the other properties mortgaged to him before selling the properties subject to the second defendant's mortgage. The appeal was dismissed except for the order regarding marshalling of securities.
JUDGMENT
Trevelyan and Beverley, JJ. - The facts which it is necessary to narrate for the purpose of determining the questions which we have to decide in this appeal are as follows: On the 21st June 1886 the first defendant mortgaged to the plaintiff, for the purpose of securing the sum of two thousand rupees with interest at 24 per cent, per annum, one pucca house and a second house, partly pucca and partly cutgha, and the land upon which those houses stand, and a 2 annas and 8 gundas 2 dunts share in Mouza Chapra Harchand. On the 17th August 1886 the first defendant mortgaged to the father of the second defendant the -pucca house above mentioned. It is admitted that when this second mortgage was executed the mortgagee had no notice of the first mortgage, except so far as the fact that the first mortgage was registered can be said to have given him notice of it. On the 30th July 1887, the second defendant's father obtained a mortgage decree against the first defendant. On the 21st June 1889 the first defendant executed another bond for Rs. 1,440, the interest then due under the bond of 21st June 1886, and for a further loan of Rs. 800, and gave to the plaintiff another mortgage of the properties covered by the first mortgage in order to secure those two sums and interest thereon at 24 per cent, per annum, On the 15th April 1891, the property, the subject of the second mortgage, was sold in pursuance of the decree to which we have referred and was purchased by the second defendant. At that sale notice was given of the plaintiff's claim under the first mortgage. This suit was brought on the 4th April 1893 for the purpose of enforcing payment of the money due to the plaintiff on the first mortgage of 21st June 1886, the plaintiff giving up his claim under the second bond on the 21st June 1889.
2. The second defendant contended that the effect of the subsequent mortgage to the plaintiff was to satisfy the claims for interest under the first mortgage which had accrued due at the time of the execution of the subsequent mortgage; and he also contended that he was entitled under the terms of Section 81 of the Transfer of Property Act to require the plaintiff in execution of this decree to sell first those of the mortgaged properties which were not covered by mortgage to the second defendant. These two contentions were negatived by the learned Subordinate Judge, and the question which we have to decide is whether that decision is right.
3. With regard to the first question, we think we must hold that the interest due under the first mortgage was not satisfied by the subsequent mortgage. The learned Subordinate Judge has rightly acted on the authority of the case of Gopal Chandra Sreemany v. Herembo Chandra Haldar ILR 16 Cal. 523. The question is, as was shown in that case, one of intention; and it is not shown here that it was the intention of the parties to get rid of the earlier security. On the contrary, although the second bond of 1889 was given partly to secure the three years' interest then due upon the amount of the bond of 1886, it is clear that the real object was to secure compound interest upon that amount, and that the intention of the parties was that the bond of 1886 should be kept alive, not only as regards the principal and future interest, but also as regards the interest for those three years. The same property is. mortgaged; the interest payable is the same; and there is no acceptance of any debt under the bond of 1886.
4. We do not, however, agree with the view which the- learned Subordinate Judge has taken of the second question. This question in the main depends upon whether mere registration is notice within the meaning: of Section 81 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 3 of that Act says: 'A person is said to have notice of a fact, when he actually knows that fact, or when but for wilful abstention from an enquiry or search, which he ought to-have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it." Although in
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