1929 Supreme(Cal) 423
CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Williams, J.
Baldeo Das Lohia - Appellant
Versus
Balmukund Brijmohan - Respondent
Decided On : 24-06-1929
The court under Section 38 can exercise only revisional jurisdiction, and has no jurisdiction to decide questions of fact.
Headnote:
Jurisdiction - Civil Procedure Code - Presidency Small Cause Courts Act - Section 37, Section 38, Revisional Jurisdiction - The court discussed the provisions of Section 37 and Section 38 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act and established that the court under Section 38 can exercise only revisional jurisdiction, and has no jurisdiction to decide questions of fact.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner brought a suit in the Court for the price of goods sold and delivered. The defence was a denial, and the seventh Judge of the Court dismissed the suit. The petitioner then applied for a new trial u/s 38, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act.
Finding of the Court:
The Full Bench had no power or jurisdiction to decide questions of fact under the provisions of Section 38 or otherwise.
Issues: The main issue was whether the Full Bench had jurisdiction to set aside the order for a new trial.
Ratio Decidendi: The court established that the court under Section 38 can exercise only revisional jurisdiction, and has no jurisdiction to decide questions of fact.
Final Decision: The application was allowed with costs, and the original order for a new trial was restored.
JUDGMENT
Williams, J. - This is an application u/s 115, Civil P.C., alleging inter alia that the Full Bench of the Court of Small Causes in Calcutta has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it. The petitioner brought a suit in the Court for the price of goods sold and delivered. The defence was a denial, and the seventh Judge of the Court, Mr. P.C. Dutt, dismissed the suit. The petitioner then applied for a new trial u/s 38, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act.
2. This application was heard by what was called a Full Bench consisting of the Chief Judge and Mr. P.C. Dutt when new grounds were added, namely that the petitioner had lately discovered fresh evidence to the effect that the defendant firm had disposed of the goods in suit to a third party, and after hearing arguments the Court granted the application, set aside the order of dismissal, restored the suit and ordered it to be heard by Latifur Rahaman, J. Fourth Bench.
3. Thereupon the defendant firm applied for a new trial to set aside the said order on the ground inter alia that the Full Bench had erred in law in setting aside the order of dismissal of the trial Court on the mere allegation of the petitioner that he had discovered fresh evidence without requiring him to give particulars, or prima facie proof of the existence of such evidence or to produce it before the Court and in finding without proof that such evidence was not available at the time of trial.
4. A Full Bench consisting of N. C. Sen, C. J., and P.C. Dutt, J. heard this application ex parte and issued a notice directing the petitioner to pro-duce documentary proof in support of his allegation that he had discovered fresh evidence.
5. The evidence upon which the petitioner relied was contained in khata books which were in the possession of one Wahed Hussain who lived more than 200 miles from Calcutta and alleged that he was ill, and the petitioner was unable to secure his attendance with his khata books in spite of the service of a subpoena. After several adjournments and after dismissing the petitioner's application for the issue of a commission, the Judges who expressed some doubt as to the genuineness of the petitioner's alleged inability to procure the attendance of his witness or produce the necessary khata books, set aside the order granting a new trial and restored the order of the trial Judge dismissing the suit. According to the petitioner they did this on the ground that they thought that it was impossible that the evidence of the witness Hussain would be believed, especially as it was sought to examine him on commission, or at any rate the possibility was not more one way than the other.
6. The question which I have to decide is whether they had jurisdiction to make this order.
7. Chapter 6, Presidency Small Causa Courts Act, bears the heading " New Trials and Appeals." Section 37 is as follows:
Save as otherwise provided by this Chapter or by any other enactments for the time being in force, every decree and order of the Small Cause Court in a suit shall be final and conclusive.
8. Section 38 provides that the Court may, on the application of either party made within eight days from the date of the decree or order in the suit, order a new trial to be held or alter, set aside or reverse the decree or order upon such terms as it thinks reasonable and may in the meantime stay the proceedings. Sections 3:) and 40 provide machinery for removing into the High Court for trial suits in which the subject-matter exceeds in value Rs. 1,000.
9. Thus it will be observed that there is no appeal from any decree or order of the Court except as provided by Section 38. The wording of this section is wide enough to cover appellate jurisdiction both on fact and on law. But it has been settled law in India for many years founded on a number of decisions of which the principal are : Sadasook Gambir Chund v. Kannayya [1896] 19 Mad. 96 Sasson v. Hurry Das Bhukut [1897] 24 Cal. 455 Srinivasa Charlu v. Balaiji Ran [1898] 21 Ma