JUDGMENT

Richard Garth, C.J. - This suit was brought against the defendants to recover the amount of a promissory note, which was alleged to have been made by them jointly with one Gourhurry Shaw. It appeared from the plaint, that a former suit had been brought by the plaintiff against Gourhurry Shaw and the defendants; but as the note was signed by Gourhurry alone, professing to act for himself and the defendants, and as the plaintiff did not prove at the trial that Gourhurry had authority to act for the defendants in making the note, the plaintiff obtained a decree against Gourhurry alone, leave being reserved to the plaintiff by the learned Judge to bring another suit upon the note against the present defendants.

2. No satisfaction of the debt having been obtained against Gourhurry under the former decree, the plaintiff brought the present suit; but the defendants' object in the first instance, that as the liability upon the note was a joint one, the judgment obtained against Gourhurry is a bar to this suit, and that the rule laid down in the case of King v. Hoare 13 M. and W. 494, 505 is applicable here. The defendants also raise the question, whether the plaintiff had authority to pledge their credit; but if they are right in the question of law, it is not necessary for us to enter upon the question of fact.

3. The learned Judge in the Court below has decided the point of law in the defendants' favour, and I entirely agree with him.

4. The rule which was laid down by the Court of Exchequer in the case of King v. Hoare 13 M. and W. 494, 505, and subsequently by the Exchequer Chamber in the case of Brinsmead v. Harrison L.R. 7 C.P. 547 is not a rule of procedure only, but of principle,--viz., that a judgment obtained against one or more of several joint contractors or joint wrong-doers operated as a bar to a second suit against any of the others. There is but one cause of action for the injured party in the case of either a joint contract or a joint tort; and that cause of action is exhausted and satisfied by a judgment being obtained by the plaintiff against all or any of the joint contractors or joint wrong-doers whom he chooses to sue. If a plaintiff, under such circumstances, were allowed to sue each of his co-debtors or wrong-doers severally in different suits, he would be practically changing a joint into a several liability.

5. This rule is so fully explained by Baron Parke, in King v. Hoare 13 M. and W. 494, 505, and by Chief Baron Kelly in Brinsmead v. Harrison L.R. 7 C.P. 547, that I do not think it necessary to enlarge further upon it.

6. It is a rule which in my opinion is founded on strict justice and public convenience; and it has been acted upon in this Court in the case of Nuthoo Lull Chowdry v. Shoukee Lall 10 B.L.R. 200.

7. It was much pressed upon us in the argument by Mr. Hill, that the effect of Section 43 of the Indian Contract Act is to enable a promisee to sue one or more of his joint promisors severally in two or more suits; or, in other words, to change a joint liability into a several one at the option of the promisee; but this, I conceive, is not the object or effect of the section. It merely allows the promisee to sue one or more of several promisors in one suit; and so practically prohibits a defendant in such a suit from objecting that his co-contractors ought to have been sued with him.

8. It is true that the rule upon which I am acting may possibly lead to some hardship in cases when one or more of several co-contractors is out of the jurisdiction, and the plaintiff, if he waits for his return, would be barred by the Statute of Limitation. But this is an injustice which the Legislature, if they so pleased, could easily remedy, and which has been, in fact, remedied in England by the Statute of 19 and 20 Vict., c. 97.

9. I consider, therefore, that the appeal should be dismissed with costs on scale No. 2.

Markby, J.

10. This suit was brought against the defendants to recover the amount due upon a promiss