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1940 Supreme(Cal) 162

CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Gadadhar Chowdhury & Ors. - Appellant
Versus
Sarat Chandra Chakravarty & Ors. - Respondent
Decided On : 24-04-1940

The onus of proving title by adverse possession is on the party asserting it. The principles of constructive possession and adverse possession apply to lands incapable of physical possession, such as forest lands or lands under the bed of a river.

Headnote:

Kanchanpur Baboos - Possession of Char Land - Touzi No. 204, Touzi No. 959 - The judgment discusses the plaintiffs' claim to the lands as reformation in situ of Ramkantapur and the defence raised by the defendants. The court analyzed the chowhuddibandi papers, Major Rennel's map, and the suits of 1902 to determine the boundaries and ownership of the disputed lands. The court also considered the principles of constructive possession and adverse possession in relation to the lands' submergence and reappearance. The final decision dismissed the appeals due to the plaintiffs' failure to prove their title to the suit lands.

Fact of the Case:

The Kanchanpur Baboos brought suits for possession of char land, claiming it as reformation in situ of Ramkantapur. The defendants raised defenses based on the lands' historical ownership, submergence, and adverse possession. The court analyzed the plaintiffs' title, the defense raised, and the findings of the lower court.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove their title to the suit lands and that the suits were not barred by limitation under Article 142 of the Limitation Act. The court also discussed the principles of constructive possession and adverse possession in relation to the lands' submergence and reappearance.

Issues: The issues included the plaintiffs' claim to the lands, the defense raised by the defendants, the applicability of Article 142 of the Limitation Act, and the principles of constructive possession and adverse possession.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the onus of proving title by adverse possession is on the party asserting it. The court also established the principles of constructive possession and adverse possession in relation to lands incapable of physical possession, such as forest lands or lands under the bed of a river.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeals due to the plaintiffs' failure to prove their title to the suit lands and held that the suits were not barred by limitation under Article 142 of the Limitation Act.

JUDGMENT

1. These two appeals are in two suits brought by the plaintiffs (called hereafter the Kanchanpur Baboos) for khas possession of a compact block of char land about 6000 bighas in area. First Appeals Nos. 173 and 174 correspond respectively to Title Suits Nos. 74 and 75 of 1925 of the first Court of the subordinate Judge at Faridpur, which on transfer were re-numbered as 10 and 11 of 1933 of the second Court of the subordinate Judge at Faridpur. The plaintiffs are the same in both the suits but the defendants are different, except that the Secretary of State for India in Council is common to both the suits. He is the principal defendant in Suit No. 75 and defendant 7 in Suit No. 74. The other principal contesting defendants in Suit No. 74 are six in number, namely Sarat Chandra Chakravarty and the Guhas. In both the suits a large number of tenants claiming to hold parcels of land either under the Secretary of State for India in Council or under Sarat Chandra Chakravarty and the Guhas, have been impleaded as defendants. As shown in the locality, Suit No. 75 comprises an area of about 3790 bighas and Suit No. 74 an area of about 2342 bighas. The subject-matter of the former suit is the western portion and of the latter the eastern portion of the compact block depicted with yellow borders within Stations Nos. 1 to 25 of the Commissioner's map (Map No. l). The plain-tiffs' title in both the suits rests upon the same grounds and the defence in both the suits is practically the same.

2. A permanently settled estate, touzi No. 204 of the Jessore Collectorate in Parganah Nasib Shahi which was subsequently transferred to the District of Faridpur and numbered touzi No. 959, belonged to Krishna Kishore Ghose and later to his widow Barnamoyee Dasi. On the death of Barnamoyee Dasi, there was a partition in 1899 amongst the heirs of Krishna Kishore Ghose. Upendra Nath Ghose got in his allotment among other properties, Dihi Kristopur appertaining to the said touzi No. 959. On 23rd October 1901, he granted a patni taluk to Mohesh Chandra Shah Chaudhury, the predecessor of the plaintiffs, comprising the Mouzas in Dihi Kristopur and the lands of some other taluks or zemindaries (ex. 6 C. 207). Mouzas Ramkantapur, Khord Ramkantapur, Bhalabad and Brittirchar alias Bittirgram are some of the Mouzas in Perganna Nasibshahi appertaining to Dihi Kristopur. Of these Mouzas, Mouza Ramkantapur is of importance in the two suits. The plaintiffs claim the whole block in suit covered by Stations Nos. 1 to 25 as reformation in situ of the said Mouza Ramkantapur. In the plaint however they claimed the same as reformation in situ of Ramkantapur and of other Mouzas of Dihi Kristopur and alternatively as accretions to those Mouzas of Dihi Kristopur, but at the trial in the Court below and also before us they confined their claim as stated above. The defendants-respondents do not contest the fact that Ramkantapur is a village included in the said permanently settled estate No. 959 or the plaintiffs' patni right in the said village.

3. The written statement of the defendants, the Guhas, the Secretary of State for India in Council and of Sarat Chandra Chakravarty, raised the following defence now material : (i) that the lands in suit were at the time of the decennial and permanent settlement of 1790 and 1793 respectively in the bed of the large public navigable river Padma or Bhubaneswar as it is called at this place and so had not been included in the permanently settled estate No. 959 of the Faridpur Collectorate; (ii) that the lands in suit are reformations in situ of estate No. 881a (Bhattichur, part II), which belongs to the Guha defendants and Sarat Chandra Chakravarty, and of estate No. 940 (Teprakandi alias Tepurchar) which belongs to Government. This estate No. 940 according to them comprised Bhattichur part I and other lands formed from the river bed; (iii) that the suits are barred by limitation; and (iv) that in any event the Secretary of State for I

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