The court's decision emphasized the broad interpretation of emergency powers and the importance of context in interpreting potentially objectionable content.

JUDGMENT

Mukerji, J. - This is an application u/s 23, Press (Emergency Powers) Act 23 of 1931. Petitioner 1 is the printer and publisher of a newspaper "Dainik Nayak" and petitioner 2 is the keeper of the "Swadesh Press" in which it is printed. The Local Government having, by orders made on 1st October 1932, declared forfeited to His Majesty a sum of Rs. 100 out of the security deposit of Rs. 500 made by petitioner 1 and the whole amount of the security deposit of Rs. 100 made by petitioner 2, in the exercise of their powers u/s 8, Sub-section (1) and Section 4, Sub-section (1) respectively of the said Act, the petitioners have made this application to set aside the said orders. The offending article appeared in the issue of the said newspaper of date 24th August 1932. Two passages in that article appeared to the Governor-in-Council to contain words of the nature described in Sub-section (1), Section 4 of the Act, as amended by Section 77 of the Special Powers Ordinance No. 10 of 1932, as those words, in the opinion of the Governor-in-Council:

tend to bring into hatred or contempt the Government established by law in British India or to excite disaffection towards His Majesty's Government.

2. The first contention urged on behalf of the petitioners is that Section 77, Special Powers Ordinance No. 10 of 1932, was ultra vires. The argument is that Clauses (c) to (i) of this section, but for the words "or which tend, directly or indirectly," which precede the clauses, are mere reproduction of Clauses (c) to (i) as contained in Section 63, Special Powers Ordinance No. 2 of 1932, and inasmuch as the latter Ordinance was promulgated on 4th January 1932, and the former on 30th June 1932, the reproduction of the clauses had the effect of prolonging the life of the earlier Ordinance against the express provision of Section 72, Government of India Act, as amended in 1919, which says that an Ordinance so promulgated shall be in force for six months only from the date of its promulgation. It has been argued also that if it is a state of emergency that gives the Governor-General authority to promulgate an Ordinance, the emergency which was caused by the conditions which existed on 4th January 1932 cannot be said to have continued as an emergency till 30th June 1932, because during the interval that elapsed there was ample time to have recourse to the legislature for such enactment as may have been necessary to meet the situation. The contention, in my opinion, is not well founded. It assumes that once a situation of emergency is created, it is the same emergency that continues; on the other hand, the same conditions, which may at one time create an emergency, may, whether they continue or disappear, well be regarded as again creating an emergency. Whether at any particular moment there is a state of emergency or not is a matter entirely for the Governor-General to judge: see AIR 1931 111 (Privy Council) . And there is nothing in Section 72, Government of India Act, which may be construed as indicating that an Ordinance, which under it, is to remain in force for six months, cannot be repeated.

3. The next contention of the petitioners is directed to establish that the passages which are said to be objectionable are not really so, if they are properly read and understood. Some objection has been taken to the translation of the article, it being said that the word "dharma" should be translated as "religion" and not righteousness, and the word "adharma" as "irreligion" and not "unrighteousness" or "evil," and that "Murari" means not "slayer of Mura" but only "enemy of Mura." I am prepared to concede that such meanings as the petitioners suggest are more literal. So far as "Murari" is concerned it is only an appellation of Sri Krishna and no sinister inference need, in any case, be drawn from the use of the word. As regards "dharma" and "adharma" I see no point in the difference as to their meaning, for "righteousness" is but the practical manifest