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1922 Supreme(Cal) 440

CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Cuming, J., Asutosh Mookerjee, J.
Rajendra Kumar Bose - Appellant
Versus
Brojendra Kumar Bose - Respondent
Decided On : 30-08-1922

The main legal point established in the judgment is that a suit for partition under Hindu Law should include all the joint properties, and the rule is founded on sound and weighty reasons to ensure a just partition.

Headnote:

Partition Suit - Hindu Law - Mitakshara, Chap. II, Section 10; Vishnu, XV, 33; Narada XIII, 32 - Norris v. Le Neve (1744) 3 Atk. 83 : 62 E.R. 850; Parker v. Gerard (1754) Am 1. 236, 27 E.R. 157 - Darvill v. Roper (1855) 3 Drewry. 294 : 3 Eq. R. 104 : 24 L.J. Ch. 779 : 3 W.R. 467 : 61 E.R. 915 : 106 R.R. 355 - Hobson v. Sherwood (1841) 4 Beav. 184 : 49 E.R. 309 : 55 R.R. 40 - Nanabhai Vallabdas v. Nathabhai Haribhai 7 B.H.C.R.A.C.J. 46; Trimbak Dixit v. Narayan Dixit 11 B.H.C.R. 69 - Hari Narayan Brahme v. Ganpatrav Daji 7 B. 272 : 4 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 183 - Malikarjuna Prasad v. Durga Prasad 27 I.A. 151 : 24 M. 147 : 2 Bom. L.R. 945 : 5 C.W.N. 74 : 10 M. 14 J. 294 : 7 Sar. P.C.J. 761 (P.C.)

Fact of the Case:

The plaintiff seeks partition of an ancestral house at Srinagar, two horses at Dacca, and a large number of moveables. The defendant contends that all the joint properties should be included in the suit and divided.

Finding of the Court:

The Subordinate Judge has overruled the defendant's objection and made a preliminary decree. On appeal, the defendant argued against partial partition, but the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the preliminary decree, and remanded the case for re-trial.

Issues: The main issue was whether the plaintiff should be allowed to sue for partial partition or if all joint properties should be included in the suit.

Ratio Decidendi: The court applied the principles of Hindu Law and established that a suit for partition should include all the joint properties. The court emphasized that the rule of including all joint property in a partition suit is founded on sound and weighty reasons and ensures a just partition.

Final Decision: The appeal was allowed, the preliminary decree was set aside, and the case was remanded for re-trial. The joint properties owned by the two brothers were to be included in the suit and dealt with in a manner consistent with justice, equity, and good conscience. If the plaintiff declined to have a partition of the entire joint estate, the suit would stand dismissed with costs in both Courts.

JUDGMENT

1. This is an appeal by the defendant in a suit for partition. The plaintiff and the defendant are two brothers, governed by the Dayabhaga school of Hindu Law. Under a testamentary disposition of their father, now deceased, they are entitled in equal shares to the properties in suit and any other properties. In this suit, the plaintiff seeks partition of an ancestral house at Srinagar two horses at Dacca and a large number of moveables. The defendant contends that all the joint properties should be included in the suit and divided, by the decree therein. The Subordinate Judge has overruled this objection, and has made a preliminary decree. On the present appeal, the defendant has urged that the plaintiff should not be allowed to sue for partial partition.

2. The principles applicable to cases of this character are well settled. The general rule is that all property held in co-tenancy and nothing but property held in co-tenancy should be included in a partition suit. A cotenant, whose title to ail undivided share of joint property is admitted of is clear, is entitled to partition as a matter of right a difficulty in making a division of the subject-matter or a resulting prejudice to some of the co-tenants, is not a sufficient ground for refusing a partition; and it has sometimes been maintained that partition may be claimed, even though it be impossible to divide the property without materially impairi, gets value, or even totally destroying it: Norris v. Le Neve (1744) 3 Atk. 83 : 62 E.R. 850; Parker v. Gerard (1754) Am 1. 236, 27 E.R. 157, Baring v. Nash (1813) 1 V. & B. 551 at p. 554 : 35 E.R. Calmady v. Calmady (1795) 2 Ves. Jur. 568 : 30 B.R. 780, Turner v. Morgan (1803) 8 Ves. 143 : 32 E.R. 307 : 149 R.R. 667; Agar v. Fairfax 1808) 17 Ves. 533 at p. 543 : 1 Wh & T.L.C. 181 : 34 E.R. 533; Clarendon v. Hornby (1718) 1 P. Wms. 446 : 24 E.R. 465 Since artition can be claimed as a matter of right, a co-tenant is hot required to make a demand or to agree upon terms prior to institution of suit. But although, as a general rule, all joint property of the co-tenants must be included in a partition suit, it is within the power of co-tenants, by mutual agreement, to make partition of a part only of the joint property, retaining the rest in common: Darvill v. Roper (1855) 3 Drewry. 294 : 3 Eq. R. 104 : 24 L.J. Ch. 779 : 3 W.R. 467 : 61 E.R. 915 : 106 R.R. 355. The principle that a partition suit should include all the property of the co-tenancy is widely recognised, and it has been pointed out that if the rule were not enforced, a co-tenant might institute as may suits to partition the property as his caprice dictated. Consequently a partial partition cannot, as a general rule, be compelled against co-tenants who do not consent thereto. But if some of the co-tenants desire to continue holding their moieties together and undivided, the Court may permit them to do so, and instead of making separate allotment to each set apart, to all who so desire, an allotment to be Hid' by them jointly. If it appears, however, that all the defendants have already received all that is equitably due to them, the remainder may be awarded to the plaintiff; this is not partial but complete partition: Hobson v. Sherwood (1841) 4 Beav. 184 : 49 E.R. 309 : 55 R.R. 40 Clarendon v. Hornby (1718) 1 P. Wms. 446 : 24 E.R. 465. The rule is enunciated in these or similar terms by text-writers of recognised authority. Thus, Breeman (Co-tenancy and Partition, Section 508) states that a tract held in common cannot be partitioned, by fragments, and a suit for partition should always embrace the whole tract held by the co-tenancy. But while it is indispensable that the whole tract should be embraced in the suit for partition it does not follow that those who are mutually desirous of Continuing the relation of co-tenancy among one, another, are obliged to have their several portions allotted to them to hold in severalty. It is true that there are cases where a par

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