1913 Supreme(Cal) 329
CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Lakhan Chandra Roy & Ors. - Appellant
Versus
Fakub Mondal & Ors. - Respondent
Rev. No. 99 of 1913
Decided On : 25-07-1913
Headnote:
Jurisdiction - Criminal Procedure Code - Sections 145, 526 - Summary: The court held that the provisions of Section 526 of the Criminal Procedure Code do not apply to proceedings under Chapter XII, including Section 145 proceedings. The Magistrate was not required to adjourn the case to allow the parties to approach the High Court under Section 526.
Fact of the Case:
The case involved an order passed under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The petitioners had filed an application under Section 526 of the Code, seeking to transfer the case to another court. The Magistrate refused to adjourn the proceedings under Section 145 to allow the petitioners to approach the High Court under Section 526.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the provisions of Section 526 do not apply to proceedings under Chapter XII, including Section 145 proceedings. The Magistrate's order refusing to adjourn the case to allow the petitioners to approach the High Court under Section 526 was not improper, and the order passed under Section 145 was not without jurisdiction.
Issues: The main issue was whether the provisions of Section 526 of the Criminal Procedure Code apply to proceedings under Chapter XII, including Section 145 proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi: The court, after considering various case laws, concluded that a party to a proceeding under Section 145 is not entitled to an adjournment of the case under sub-section 8 of Section 526.
Final Decision: The court discharged the rule and upheld the Magistrate's order.
JUDGMENT
1. The Rule was issued to show cause why the order passed under sec. 145, Cr. P. C., should not be set aside on the ground that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to go on with the proceedings after an application under sec. 526, Cr. P. C., had been made before him. The only point that requires to be Considered in this case is whether the provisions of sec. 526 have any application to proceedings under Chap. XII of the Code.
2. After carefully considering the cases, Lolit Mohun Moitra v. Surju Kanta Acharjee I. L. R. 28 Cal. 709 (1901), In re Pandurang Govind Pujari I. L. R. 25 Bom. 179 (1900), In re Arumuga Tegundan I. L. R. 26 Mad. 188 (1902), Gurudas Nag v. Gaganendra Nath Tagore 2 C. L. J. 644 (1905) and Jaggu Ahir v. Murli Shukul I. L. R. 34 All. 533 (1912), and on considering the effect of the provisions of sec. 435, Cr. P. C., in respect of proceedings under Chap. XII of the Code, we are of opinion that a party to a proceeding under sec. 145 is not entitled to an adjournment of the case under sub-sec. 8 of sec. 526.
3. That being our view, the order of the Magistrate refusing to postpone the case to enable the Petitioners to come up to this Court under sec. 526 was not improper and therefore the order made under sec. 145 is not without jurisdiction. We therefore discharge this Rule.