The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the existence of a tenancy agreement based on the absence of a written lease, the conduct of the parties, and surrounding circumstances, and the concept of anticipatory breach of contract.

JUDGMENT

Asutosh Mookerjee, J. - This is an appeal by the plaintiffs in a suit for realization of rent of a godown taken on lease by the defendant, firm. The case for the plaintiffs was, that the defendant, firm came into occupation in January 1917, under the arrangement that the tenancy would last for a term of three years ending in December 1919, and that the rent payable would be Rs. 250 a month. The defendants remained in occupation till the 31st Marsh 1918, but on the 27th February 1918 the plaintiffs were served with a notice of relinquishment. They forthwith protested that the tenancy would not be surrendered in this manner; but, notwithstanding: their objection, the defendants vacated the premises, with the result that the plaintiffs re-entered with effect from the 1st April 1918. The plaintiffs accordingly claimed rent for the unexpired period of the lease. The case for the defendants was that there was neither in fact nor in law a tenancy for three years, that the states of the defendants was that of a tenant from month to month and that the tenancy was terminated by the notice which was duly served. The defendants further contended that the plaintiffs were not entitled to succeed in the suit as framed, and that in any event, they could not recover the whole sum claimed. The Subordinate Judge name to the conclusion that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that there was a tenancy for a term of three years and accordingly dismissed the suit. On the present appeal, three questions have been argued on behalf of the plaintiffs, namely, first, whether there was in fact an agreement to lease for a term of three years or whether there was a contract of tenancy from month to month; secondly, assuming that there was in fact an agreement to lease for three years, whether the relation of landlord and tenant for a term of three years was in law constituted, and, thirdly, if there was in fact and in law a tenancy for a term of three years, what are the reliefs which the plaintiffs can claim.

2. As regards the first point it may be stated at the outset that there is no written lease nor is there correspondence between the parties to show that there was a contract of tenancy for a term of three years. One of the plaintiffs has pledged his oath that there was an agreement that the tenancy would continue for three years from January 1917 to December 1919 and that this agreement was made with one Arjun Babu who was the temporary manager of the defendant firm When the tenancy was created. The Subordinate Judge has not believed this statement, and has stated his reasons in the following passage of his judgment. "Nilkrishna Babu" the second plaintiff, "is certainly a very big man, but he is still a party and unless his evidence is undoubtedly satisfactory and conclusive on the point, the Court cannot pass a decree for a fairly large amount on his testimony." The reasons thus assigned by the Subordinate Judge for disbelieving the plaintiff are neither adequate nor convincing. There is no inflexible rule that if a party, plaintiff or defendant, gives his testimony, he must be disbelieved, because he is a party to the suit. Such a rule, if adopted would nullify the provisions of Section 120 of the Indian Evidence Act, which provides that in all civil proceedings, the parties to the suit shall be competent witnesses. When a plaintiff has deposed in support of his case, his testimony must be scrutinised in the same manner as that of any other witness: and the Court is free to attach to the evidence that amount of credence which it appears to deserve, from his demeanour, deportment under cross-examination, motives to speak or hide the truth, means of knowledge, power of memory, and other tests, by which the Value of a statement of a witness can be ascertained if not with absolute certainty yet with finch a reasonable amount of conviction as ought to justify a man of ordinary prudence in acting upon those statements. Now, if we consider the ev