1930 Supreme(Cal) 382
CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Rankin, C.J, Graham, J.
Fakir Chand Mondal & Ors. - Appellant
Versus
Madar Mondal & Ors. - Respondent
Decided On : 18-12-1930
The judgment emphasizes the need to focus on questions of fact in possession disputes and highlights the limitations on the High Court's revisional power, stating that interference in revision should only occur in cases with special circumstances or errors of law calling for higher authority's interference.
Headnote:
Magistrate - Possession Dispute - 145, Criminal P.C. - Summary of Acts and Sections: Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code (Criminal P.C.) - The judgment discusses the interpretation and application of Section 145, Criminal P.C. by the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge in a possession dispute case. The court emphasizes the importance of focusing on questions of fact rather than complicated questions of title or right to possession. It also highlights the limitations on the High Court's revisional power and the need for special circumstances to examine evidence for a possible miscarriage of justice.
Fact of the Case:
The Magistrate was trying a proceeding under Section 145, Criminal P.C. to determine possession in a land dispute. The Sessions Judge recommended setting aside the Magistrate's order and reporting the case to the High Court.
Finding of the Court:
The Chief Justice rejected the reference, emphasizing the Magistrate's careful consideration of the question of fact regarding possession and criticizing the Sessions Judge for going into evidence and coming to a different conclusion on the facts. Justice Graham agreed with the rejection, deeming the reference wholly unnecessary.
Issues: The main issue was the recommendation by the Sessions Judge to set aside the Magistrate's order in a possession dispute case under Section 145, Criminal P.C.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized the importance of focusing on questions of fact in possession disputes and highlighted the limitations on the High Court's revisional power, stating that interference in revision should only occur in cases with special circumstances or errors of law calling for higher authority's interference.
Final Decision: The reference was rejected by the Chief Justice, and Justice Graham concurred with the decision.
JUDGMENT
Rankin, C.J. - In my opinion this reference must be rejected.
2. It appears that a Magistrate of the First Class was trying a proceeding u/s 145, Criminal P.C. and ho came to the conclusion that, the second party was shown to be in possession. The learned Sessions Judge of Khulna has u/s 435, Criminal P.C., called for the record and has exercised his power u/s 438 in reporting the case to the High Court. He reports the case "with the recommendation that the order finding that the second party was in possession of the land and prohibiting interference with such possession should be set aside . Ho suggests that the true finding in the case would have been a finding that the first party was in possession. He recommends that the Magistrate's order be vacated, but he does not appear to recommend that this Court should declare the first party to be in possession with the usual reliefs. He suggests that the order should simply be vacated and that, thereupon if there be any reason still to apprehend a breach of the peace, the proceeding should either be begun all over again or the Magistrate should take action u/s 107, Criminal P.C. I may say that the judgment of the Magistrate is dated in April of this year and the reference by the Sessions Judge is dated in June. We are now in the middle of December.
3. When I come to look at the judgment of the Magistrate, it appears to me that there is one criticism which cannot be made against it. It is a judgment which confines itself entirely to the question of fact as to whether the first party or the second party was in actual possession, and the Magistrate is most careful to deal in no way with complicated questions of title nor is he in his judgment mixing up the question of the right to possession with the question of actual possession. It seems that the first party claimed that the land until about a year before the proceedings 'belonged to one Patua Bewa. That is agreed by all the parties. The first party say that Kushilal used to live with Patua Bewa and looked after all her affairs, ploughed her lands and so on and that after her death he remained in possession, and the second party say that they are the heirs and reversioners of Patua Bewa, that they were looking after her property all along and that on her death they succeeded to the possession of the property.
4. The Magistrate has given four reasons which led him upon the evidence to hold that the story of the second party that they got possession on the death of Patua Bewa was true. First, he says the neighbouring and adjoining witnesses prove it; secondly, the tenants on the land prove it; thirdly, the house of the second party adjoins the disputed land and that of the first party is at a distance, and fourthly, he makes an observation-a very proper observation- which has been entirely misconstrued by the learned Sessions Judge. He says:
They are the natural heirs and reversioners of Patua Bewa who was undoubtedly the owner till her death.
5. It is on the strength of that and the following observation that most of the criticism has been made. The Magistrate goes on to say:
So though Kushilal of the first party might have been with Patua, he could not be in possession alter the death of Patua about a year back. The second party took up the possession; so it is that the first party took a settlement from the landlord who 'had not the slightest right to lease out to anyone when the heirs and reversioners to the deceased were in existence.
6. Because of that observation it is said that the Magistrate has not addressed himself to the question of fact, but has addressed himself to the question of title or the question of right. To my mind, that is a most unreasonable criticism. Having shown that the second party ware living on the spot, the Magistrate, as one of his reasons for finding that they would get possession on the death of Patua Bewa, says that they are Patua Bewa's natural heirs and reversioners. That is a circumstance which