CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Sanderson, C.J, Newbould, J., Buckland, J.
Thomas - Appellant
Versus
Thomas - Respondent
Decided On : 17-11-1924
Divorce - Indian Divorce Act, 1869 - Section 2 - Section 2 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 requires specific findings in respect of the material facts necessary for the petitioner to prove in order to bring the case within its provisions. The court also discussed the correct principle in assessing damages under the Act.
Fact of the Case:
The court found the judgment of the learned Judge to be insufficient and remanded the case to the District Judge for specific findings in respect of the material facts necessary for the petitioner to prove under Section 2 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. The District Judge later sent up the case again with findings, and the court confirmed the decree with necessary corrections.
Finding of the Court:
The court found the judgment of the learned Judge to be insufficient and remanded the case for specific findings. Upon receiving the findings, the court confirmed the decree with necessary corrections.
Issues: Insufficiency of judgment, specific findings required under Section 2 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, correct principle in assessing damages under the Act.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized the need for specific findings in respect of the material facts necessary for the petitioner to prove under Section 2 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. Additionally, the court discussed the correct principle in assessing damages under the Act.
Final Decision: The court confirmed the decree with necessary corrections, including the dissolution of the marriage and the assessment of damages and costs.
JUDGMENT
Sanderson, C.J. - In this case we are of opinion that the matter must be remanded to the learned District Judge on the ground that in our opinion the judgment of the learned Judge is not sufficient.
2. In the first place there is nothing in the learned Judge's judgment to show that the case comes within the provisions of Section 2 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. That section provides that Nothing herein after contained shall authorise any Court to grant any relief under this Act, except in cases where the petitioner professes the Christian religion and resides in India at the time of presenting the petition. There is no finding as to the matters referred to therein. The section further provides or to make decrees of dissolution of marriage except in the following cases:---(a) where the marriage shall have been solemnized in India; or (6) where the adultery...complained of shall have been committed in India.
3. All that the learned Judge says in his judgment is as follows:---I am satisfied of the factum of adultery, and that the petitioner has in no way connived at or condoned it. The marriage is therefore declared to be dissolved.
4. This Court requires specific findings in respect of the material facts which it is necessary for the petitioner to prove in order to bring the case within Section 2 of the Divorce Act.
5. We have referred to this matter on several occasions; and it is sufficient for me to refer to the case of Singrai Santhal v. Puraigi Santhalini (1920) 31 C. L. J. 340.
6. In the second place it is not clear to this Court whether the learned Judge has proceeded upon the correct principle in assessing the damages at Rs. 20,000. The learned Judge said: Apart from any question of sentiment, the wrong inflicted upon him is one for which he deserves substantial compensation, and moreover it is more than likely that he will incur considerable expense in the matter of the disposal of the two children of the marriage.
7. For the purpose of stating the correct principle reference may be made to the charge to the jury of the learned President of the Probate Division in the case of Keyse v. Keyse and Maxwell (1886) L. R. 11 P. D. 100. which is as follows:
8. There is no doubt about the adultery, it has been proved and admitted; and the question therefore that remains for you to consider is what damages, if any, the co-respondent is to pay. Now I am obliged to explain the principle upon which damages are to be given; and, first, you must remember that you are not here to punish at all. Any observations directed to that end are improperly addressed to you. All that the law permits a jury to give is compensation for the loss which the husband has sustained. That is the only guide to the amount of damages to be given. But, undoubtedly, if it is proved that the man has led a happy life with his wife, that she has taken care of his children, that she has assisted in his business, and then some man appears upon the scene and seduces the wife away from her husband, then the jury will take those facts into consideration. But the question in this case, as in so many others' is, whether or not these losses have been cast upon the petitioner by the action of the co-respondent. If he did not seduce her away from her husband, that makes a very material difference in considering the amount of damages to be given. In considering these questions undoubtedly the conduct of the husband must be looked to. Here the husband and wife had been leading an unhappy life before they parted, and he knew she had no means of living. It is for you to judge whether he had really made any effectual efforts to discover where she was---effectual' I mean, in the sense of being such as a man would really take if he had his heart in the inquiry. If you come to the conclusion that he did not make any earnest inquiry after her, that is a fact you could consider when you are considering the question of the damages he has sustained by some man consorting with his w
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