JUDGMENT

1. This appeal is directed against an order by which the Court of Appeal below, in concurrence with the Court of first instance, has refused an application for restitution u/s 141 of the CPC of 1908. The circumstances under which that application was made may be briefly stated. The respondents commenced an, action against the appellants on the 9th February 1903 for declaration of title to Immovable property, for confirmation of possession, and, in the alternative, for recovery of possession. The suit was decreed on the 31st August 1903 by the primary Court, in these terms: "The plaintiffs do get confirmation of possession, and, in the alternative, khas possession." Upon appeal, this decree was confirmed by the District Judge on the 19th February 1904. On appeal to this Court, the decree of the District Judge was set aside on the 2nd March 1906 and the case was remanded for re-consideration. The District Judge, on the 18th August 1906, again affirmed the decree of the original Court. On appeal to this Court, this decree was set aside on the 6th April 1910 and the case was again remanded. On the 10th June 1910, the District Judge re-heard the appeal and discharged the decree of the Court of first instance. The decree of the District Judge has been this day affirmed by this Court. The position, therefore, is that the erroneous decree of the Court of first instance was in full operation from the 31st August 1903 to the 10th June 1910. The case for the appellants is, that, on the 2nd September 1903, the successful plaintiffs by force obtained possession of the disputed property; they pray, accordingly, that u/s 144 of the Civil Procedure Code, the plaintiffs-respondents be directed to deliver up the property together with the profits enjoyed in the interval by virtue of their possession. The Courts below have dismissed the application on the ground that it is not maintainable u/s 144, inasmuch as, according to the cage of the applicants, the respondents did not obtain delivery of possession by execution of the decree. The Courts have held in substance that the only remedy of the appellants is by way of a suit for ejectment and mesne profits. In our opinion, this view cannot be supported.

2. Section 144 provides that where and in so far as a decree is varied or reversed, the Court of first instance shall, on the application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be made, as will, so far as may be, place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed: and for this purpose, the Court may make any orders, including orders for the refund of costs and for the payment of interest, damages, compensation and mesne profits which are properly consequential on such variation or reversal. Sub-section (2) of the section further provides that no suit shall be instituted for the purpose of obtaining any restitution or other relief which could be obtained by application under sub Section (1). It is worthy of note that the section does not expressly state that the successful party becomes entitled to the benefit by way of restitution, only when he has been deprived of the property in execution of a decree which is ultimately set aside; and we ought not to adopt a narrow construction so as to restrict the application of this salutary provision of the law, which was enacted with a view to shorten litigation and afford speedy relief. In the case before us, on the 31st August 1903, the plaintiffs were declared to be the rightful proprietors of the property. If, as the appellants allege, the successful party subsequently obtained possession, that possession must be attributed to the decree in their favour. Indeed it; has not been suggested to us that after the date of the decree, the respondents could, have taken possession of this property under any independent claim of right; and as they held the decree