CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
N.R. Chatterjea, J., Asutosh Mookerjee, J.
Chatterjee Brahmin - Appellant
Versus
Durgadutt Agarwalla & Ors. - Respondent
Decided On : 23-08-1915
Jurisdiction - Ex Parte Decree - CPC - Order IX, Rule 5 - [Order IX, Rule 5] - The court held that a decree made against a defendant who was not properly served with summons cannot bind him. The court also held that a partner cannot bind his co-partner by a compromise in a suit unless authorized by a power-of-attorney.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff and the fourth defendant were partners in a business with the first three defendants. The first three defendants, who were infants, sued the plaintiff and the fourth defendant for dissolution of partnership, adjustment of accounts, appointment of a receiver, and other reliefs. The plaintiff, who was residing outside British India, was not properly served with summons. The first defendant, who was arrested, compromised the suit without the plaintiff's consent. The plaintiff sued to set aside the decree.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the plaintiff was not properly served with summons and that the first defendant had no authority to bind the plaintiff by the compromise. The court held that the decree was not binding on the plaintiff.
Issues: Whether the decree obtained against the plaintiff was binding on him, considering he was not properly served with summons and the compromise was made without his consent.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that a decree made against a defendant who was not properly served with summons cannot bind him. The court also held that a partner cannot bind his co-partner by a compromise in a suit unless authorized by a power-of-attorney.
Final Decision: The court allowed the appeal, set aside the decree of the Subordinate Judge, and decreed the suit. The decree in the prior suit was set aside and revived for retrial.
JUDGMENT
Mookerjee, J. - This is an appeal by the Plaintiff in a suit to set aside what has been described as an ex parte decree. The circumstances under which the decree in question was obtained against the plaintiff are beyond controversy. The first three defend ants had a six-annas share in a partner ship business under a deed dated the 21st April 1909, while the plaintiff and the fourth defendant who are relations had each a five annas share. On the 24th May 1912 the first three defendants, who were, at the time, infants, instituted a suit against the plaintiff and the fourth defendant for dissolution of partnership, for adjustment of accounts, for appointment of a Receiver and for other incidental reliefs. The claim was valued at Rs. 22.000. At that time the plaintiff, who was then the second defend ant was stated on the face of the plaint to be resident beyond the limits of British India namely, at Somaser in Rajputana. The fourth defendant, who was the first defendant in that suit, was a resident of the place where the suit was instituted. On the day the plaint was filed, an application was made by the then plaintiffs for the issue of a warrant for arrest of the then first defendant and a warrant for attachment, before judgment, of all the partnership assets. The Subordinate Judge directed the issue of the warrants, ordered summonses to issue, and fixed the 10th June 1912 for the trial of the suit. The warrants of arrest and attachment were issued forthwith. The summons upon the second defendant, which was issued on the day following, reached the Political Agent at Rajputana on or about the 1st June 1912, and was returned by him to the Court with the remark that it was impossible to serve the summons upon the defendant in time, as the date fixed for hearing the case was too close at hand; at the same time a request was made by him that a more distant date might be fixed; the date suggested was six weeks from the 1st June. Before the summons so returned had reached the Court of the Subordinate Judge, the proceedings had, however, been pushed on behalf of the plaintiffs with extreme rapidity. We find it noted in the order-sheet that on the 27th May, that is, within three days of the institution of the suit, the first defendant had been arrested, and had received intimation from the Court that unless he furnished security for Rs. 15,000, he would be forth with sent to the Civil Jail. On the 30th May, we find that the suit had been compromised. The first defendant had paid to the plaintiffs Rs. 13,000 and had agreed to pay Rs. 5,800 in specified instalments. A decree was made on these terms and the first defendant was released from arrest. Whether a decree obtained by consent under the circumstances described would be operative against the person who had consented thereto, is a question which does not directly arise for consideration in the present appeal; but we have to determine whether such decree is binding upon the other defendant to the suit who was absent in Rajputana.
2. It appears from the petition of compromise that the first defendant entered into the settlement both for himself and his absent partner. He professed to represent his partner on the basis of a power-of-attorney to which reference will presently be made. The decree, however, does not mention the petition of compromise, and does not even recite that it was made by consent; but it directs both the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum of Rs. 5,800 with costs by six monthly instalments on the dates specified, subject to the proviso that if default Was made in the payment of a single instalment, the plaintiffs would be at liberty to enforce the entire decree by execution. The decree, consequently, on the face of it binds both the then defendants. The plaintiff was thus driven to institute this suit on the 8th October 1912 to set aside this decree. His contention is that he is not bound by this decree; first, because he was in essence not a party to the
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