JUDGMENT

Krishnan, J. - The main question argued in this second appeal is whether Article 44 of the Limitation Act applies to it or not. The plaint property originally belonged to the 1st defendant He executed a sale deed for it to his wife Irulayi, and the properly then became hers. The plaintiff is her only fan by the 1st defendant. She died some time ago and the lower Courts have held, and it is not disputed before us, that or her death the property passed to the plaintiff and he became solely entitled to it. In 1909 when the plaintiff was still a minor, his father, the 1st defendant, and his father's brother, one Palaniyandi now deceased, executed a sale deed, Exhibit I, to the 2nd defendant benami for the 4th defendant for the plaint property. In that deed the plaintiff is named as one of the vendors, the 1st defendant executing it on his behalf as his father and guardian; this is so expressly recited in the deed. The plea of limitation has reference to this deed, it being contended that the plaintiff cannot recover the property until the transfer by it is set aside and that as more than 3 years have elapsed since he has become a major, he is barred from doing so under Article 44. The lower Appellate Court has held, differing from the District Munsif, that this Article does not apply and that Article 141 applies. That Court seems, however, to have been somewhat misled by confusing the question with one of cancellation of a document which is dealt with under Article 91. There is no question of cancelling a document under Article 44, which speaks only of setting aside the transfer, though the result of setting aside a transfer may generally be to invalidate the deed of transfer where one exists. The cases under Article 91 referred to by the Sub-Judge are, therefore, not in point. When a guardian acting in his capacity of guardian sells or otherwise transfers the property of his ward, there can be no question that Article 44 will apply to the suit by the ward to recover that property subsequently, for he must get the guardian's transfer set aside, which is prima, facie binding on him. A transfer by a guardian, however improper it may have been, is not a void transaction but only a voidable one and when property cannot be recovered without avoiding it, it is now settled that Article 44 will apply to the suit. See Ranga Reddi v. Narayana Reddi 28 M. 423.; Madugula Latchiah v. Pally Mukkalinga 30 M. 393 : 2 M.L.T. 351 : 17 M.L.J. 220.; Kandasami Naicken v Irusappa Naicken. 40 Ind. Cas. 664 : 41 M. 102 : 33 M.L.J. 309.; Sivavadevelu Pillay v. Ponnammal 15 Ind. Cas. 365 : 22 M.L.J. 404 : 11 M.L.T. 198 : (1912) M.W.N. 383 and Munugarra Satyalakshmi Narayana v. Munugarra Jagnnadhan 42 Ind. Cas. 939 : 34 M.L.J. 220 : 6 L.W. 765 : (1917) M.W.N. 854 : 22 M.L.T. 498.

2. No doubt it has been held that, where a Hindu father sells the joint ancestral property of himself and his minor son, Article 44 will not apply even though he purported to act as his minor son's guardian in making the sale. See kathapeiumal Theran v, Ramalinga Theoan 27 Ind. Cas. 695 : 17 M.L.T. 138, and Ganesa Aiyar v. Amirthasami Odayar 44 Ind. Cas. 603 : 23 M.L.T. 245 : (1918) M.W.N 892. Article 126 expressly provides for setting aside such alienation of ancestral property and the Court, therefore, held in those oases that the mere fact that the father executed the deed also as guardian of his minor son made no difference to the validity of the sale, as he Could have passed his son's share also by executing the deed himself and, therefore, Article 44 was not applicable. Those rulings, however, apply to alienations of ancestral property and are Clearly distinguishable from the present case, as hero the property has been found to be the minor's separate property.

3. Reliance was also placed by the learned Vakil for the respondent on the case in Ammani Ammal v. Ramaswami Naidu 51 Ind. Cas. 57 : 10 L.W. 79 : 37 M.L.J. 113 : (1919) M.W.N. 866. In that case the mother, though