The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement for a plaintiff to prove possession within the specified timeframe in a suit for recovery of possession, as per the provisions of the Limitation Act.

JUDGMENT

Cuming, J. - In the suit out of which this appeal has arisen the plaintiffs sued to recover possession of some 155 bighas of land on the ground that they form part of their ancestral patni taluk. Their case is that these lands were formerly in their possession as part of their taluk and that they were diluviated many years ago when the whole mouza was diluviated and was under water. In the year 1896 they began, to re-form but remained unfit for cultivation up to the year 1905; that when they went to take possession of the lands on the strength of their former possession before the diluvion and their putni right they were resisted by the defendant who declared that he had obtained possession of these lands in Assar 1312 corresponding to June 1905 in execution of a decree. The defendant resisted the plaintiff's suit on various grounds, one of which was that the suit was barred by limitation as the plaintiffs were not in possession of the lands within 12 years of the date of the suit.

2. The suit has been subject of a number of decisions. The first Court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit on the ground that the question between the parties was res judicata. On appeal to the District Judge he reversed this finding and remanded the case for trial to the first Court. An appeal to the High Court against this order of the District Judge was unsuccessful. The case then went back to the Subordinate Judge, and in January 1924 he dismissed the plaintiffs' suit holding that it is barred by limitation. He held that it was not proved that the plaintiffs had been in possession of these lands within 12 years before the institution of the suit. The plaintiffs appealed to the District Judge. The District Judge held that Article 141 and not Article 142 applied to the suit, and on this finding he found that the suit was not barred by limitation. He allowed the appeal, decreed the suit and ordered that the plaintiffs would recover possession of the decretal land by ejecting the defendant. Further, that the plaintiffs would get wasilat for the period of three years before the institution of the suit till delivery of possession. The defendant appeals to this Court, and in this appeal he has contended that the article which applies to the present suit is Article 142 and not Article 144.

3. There was a preliminary objection by the respondents that the appeal was incompetent, their ground apparently being that no copy of a decree of the lower appellate Court having been filed to this Court along with the memorandum of appeal as required by the Civil Procedure Code. The facts would appear to be these: The appeal was actually heard by the District Judge on the 30th June 1925 when ha set aside the judgment of the Subordinate Judge. The decree was signed on the 4th of July. The appeal was filed in this Court on the 14th August. On the 14th September, on an application by the plaintiffs, the District Judge, as the learned advocate for the respondents described it, brought the decree into conformity with the judgment. He would seem to contend, if I understand him rightly, that the decree of the 4th July was thereby set aside and for it a new decree was substituted, and as there is no copy of this decree before the Court the appeal is incompetent. But the real facts are that on the 14th September the District Judge did not in any way alter the decree or bring it into conformity with the judgment, because as a matter of fact the decree was already in conformity with the judgment. What he did was to add a few words in order, apparently, to make it quite clear what the decree meant, although I may say, speaking for myself, that the decree was perfectly clear before. He did not in any way alter the decree. Therefore I do not think that the appeal is incompetent.

4. I will now deal with the appeal before us. The appellant contends that the article which would apply to the present case is Article 142 of the Limitation Act and not Article 144. To discover which is t