JUDGMENT

1. We are invited in this appeal to set aside an order by which the Court below has overruled an objection, taken by the appellants to the grant of probate of a Will alleged to have been executed by one Anna Purna Dasi, the widow of their deceased elder brother. It appears that, upon the death of Anna Purna, an application for the probate of her Will was made by the respondents, who are the sons of her uterine sister. In the application, the nearest relations of the deceased were stated to be the younger brothers of her husband and the sons of her step-mother. Notices were duly served upon these persons, and they entered caveats. When the case came on for trial, the learned District Judge held that both sets of objectors could not be allowed to contest the validity of the Will, inasmuch as, if either set was held to be entitled to succeed to the estate of the deceased in the event of an intestacy, it must be to the exclusion of the other set; consequently, both pets of objectors could not be treated as persons claiming to have an interest in the (state of the deceased within the meaning of Section 69 of the Probate and Administration Act, 1881. In this view, the District Judge proceeded to determine whether the younger brothers of the husband of the deceased or her step-brothers would be the preferential heirs in the event of intestacy. He came to the conclusion that the younger brothers of the husband had no interest in the estate in the presence of the half-brothers. He, therefore, held that they had no locus standi to take exception to the genuineness of the Will propounded, and overruled their objections. Subsequently the step-brothers did not contest the proceedings with the result that the Will was prayed in common form and probate was granted to the sons of the uterine sister of the testatrix. The younger brothers of the husband of the deceased have row appealed against the order by which their objection was overruled, and, on their behalf, it has been contended that they were preferential heirs to the step-brothers and were entitled to be represented is the proceedings in the Court below. Their claim has been contested on the ground that under the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law, a stepbrother is entitled to succeed to the Ayantnka stridhan property of a childless widow preference to the younger brother of her husband. In our opinion, there is no room for reasonable doubt that the view taken by the Court below is erroneous, and is contrary to the order of succession laid down by Jimuta Vahana.

2. In Chapter 4, Section 3 of the Duyabhaga, Jimuta Vahana discusses the question of succession to the separate property of a childless woman. The first nine paragraphs of the Section deal with the question of succession to nuptial presents and other matters, with which we are not at present concerned. Paragraphs 10 to 28 are then devoted to a discussion of the question of succession to stridhan property, which has been received as a present by a woman after marriage, inclusive of gifts by kindred and sulku. The result of the discussion is summarized in paragraph 29, which is in these terms: Therefore, the property goes first to the whole brothers; if there be none, to the mother; if she be dead, to the father; but on failure of all these, it devolves on the husband. Thus Katyayan says, 'that which has been given to her by her kindred, goes, on failure of kindred, to her husband.' "Paragraph 30 then explains the text of Katyayana, and it is pointed out that the expression failure of the kindred" implies absence not merely of the father and mother, but, also of brothers. Paragraph 31 commences a discussion as to the order of succession upon failure of the first group of four successive heirs, already named, namely, the whole brother, the mother, the father and the husband. It may be observed, here in passing that paragraph 31 has been inaccurately translated by Colebrooke, inasmuch as, in his rendering of the text of Vrihaspa