1925 Supreme(Cal) 498
CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Walmsley, J., Mukerji, J.
Dwijendra Nath Mullick & Anr. - Appellant
Versus
Gopiram Gobindram - Respondent
Decided On : 15-05-1925
An agreement is not opposed to public policy if it does not interfere with the administration of justice and has a lawful consideration.
Headnote:
agreement - public policy - Contract Act Section 23
Fact of the Case:
Defendant, a servant in the plaintiff firm, cashed a cheque and falsely reported theft. Plaintiff agreed to drop the prosecution in exchange for Rs. 15,000 and a mortgage. The suit was filed for enforcement of the mortgage.
Finding of the Court:
The agreement was not opposed to public policy as it did not interfere with the administration of justice. The Court found no lack of free consent and held the second Defendant liable due to a lawful consideration.
Issues: Enforceability of the agreement, free consent, liability of the second Defendant
Ratio Decidendi: The agreement did not interfere with the administration of justice and had a lawful consideration. Lack of free consent was not established, and the second Defendant was held liable due to a valid consideration.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed with costs.
JUDGMENT
Walmsley, J. - This appeal is preferred by the defendants and the question that it raises is whether the agreement on which the suit is based was opposed to public policy.
2. The first defendant, Dwijendra was employed by the plaintiff firm, and on 3rd March 1919, he was sent to the bank to cash a cheque for Rs. 30,000. He cashed the cheque and then went to the police with the story that the money had been stolen from him. This story was found to be untrue and he was arrested. Friends of the family went to a solicitor, Mr. Akhoy Kumar Bose, and through his efforts it was arranged that the plaintiff firm would agree to the prosecution being given up, if they received Rs. 15,000 in cash and a mortgage for a sum of Rs. 5,000. This, mortgage was executed by Dwijendra and his brother Rajendra, and it is the document upon which the suit is based. The plaintiffs, on their side carried out the terms of the arrangement; they signed a petition to the Commissioner of Police, asking that the prosecution should not be continued, and the Commissioner gave his consent. The Presidency Magistrate afterwards wrote "file" on the petition; whether he passed a formal order of discharge or not, we do not know, but I do not think it is of any importance.
3. None of these facts has been challenged before us, and the arguments have been confined to legal points. It is urged that the consideration of the agreement was unlawful as offending against the principle laid down in S.'23 of the Contract Act. A second argument was that the plaintiff cannot fall back upon the debt, but that argument need not be considered because, Sir Benode Chandra Mitter for the respondent said he had no intention of doing so. A third argument is that at any rate the second defendant cannot be held liable.
4. The first argument, shortly stated, is that the agreement was one for stifling a prosecution. If that is a correct description of it, then it cannot be enforced, but the learned Judge has found to the contrary and has given his reason for his conclusions.
5. The statute law of this country on the subject is to be found in Section 23 of the Contract Act. It is as follows:" The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful unless...the Court regards it as immoral or opposed to public policy ".... Illus. (h)--" A promises B to drop a prosecution which he has instituted against B for robbery, and B promises to restore the value of the things taken. The agreement is void, as its object is unlawful." The illustration unfortunately does not throw much light on a difficult matter.
6. In the present instance there is no room for the suggestion that the plaintiffs are making "trade of felony." On the contrary they assented to such generous terms that the defence set up by the appellants wears a most repulsive appearance. If however, the agreement was contrary to public policy as explained in the Contract Act and in English decisions then we shall have no alternative but to dismiss the suit, however repugnant to our feelings such a course may be.
7. The offence with which defendant Dwijendra was charged was not compoundable under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, and if the negotiations are to be regarded as a composition of such a noncompoundable offence then the conclusion must be that the object of the agreement was contrary to public policy. It is necessary, therefore, to see what the arrangement was. It is fully described by Mr. Bose, the solicitor, and he says that so far from pressure coming from the plaintiffs it was brought about at the request and entreaties of the defendants. In cross-examination he speaks about the case being withdrawn, and about the plaintiffs agreeing to drop the proceedings, but we must look at what the plaintiffs actually did to determine whether those expressions are correct.
8. The first thing they did was to write a letter or petition to the Deputy Commissioner; it was returned and another petition was written addressed to the Co