1925 Supreme(Cal) 653
CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Keramat Mandal & Anr. - Appellant
Versus
King-Emperor - Respondent
Decided On : 12-02-1925
Misjoinder of charges and erroneous admission of evidence can vitiate a trial, leading to the decision to set aside the conviction and sentence and send the case back for retrial.
Headnote:
Misjoinder of Charges - Indian Penal Code - Section 366, Section 376 - The court discussed the misjoinder of charges under Sections 366 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code, highlighting the improper joint charge against both accused persons and the erroneous admission of evidence, leading to the decision to set aside the conviction and sentence and send the case back for retrial.
Fact of the Case:
The appellants were tried on charges under Sections 366 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code. The jury returned a guilty verdict, but the trial was found to be vitiated due to misjoinder of charges and erroneous admission of evidence.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the trial was vitiated due to misjoinder of charges and erroneous admission of evidence, leading to the decision to set aside the conviction and sentence and send the case back for retrial.
Issues: Misjoinder of charges, erroneous admission of evidence
Ratio Decidendi: The misjoinder of charges and erroneous admission of evidence vitiated the trial, leading to the decision to set aside the conviction and sentence and send the case back for retrial.
Final Decision: The conviction and sentence passed on the appellants were set aside, and the case was sent back for retrial.
JUDGMENT
1. The appellants in this case, Keramat Mandal and Belat Ali Mandal, were tried by the Sessions Judge of Rajshahi with the assistance of a jury on two charges under Sections 366 and 376, Indian Penal Code. The jury returned an unanimous verdict of guilty against the first appellant on both charges and a verdict by a majority of four to one of guilty on both charges against Belat Ali. The learned Sessions Judge accepted the verdict and sentenced both the appellants to transportation for life Tinder Section 376, Indian Penal Code, no separate sentence being awarded under S. 66, Indian Penal Code.
2. On behalf of the appellants several grounds have been taken the first of which being with reference to misjoinder of charges. With regard to the first charge u/s 366, Indian Penal Code, no objection is taken and it appears to us to be quite in order. The difficulty is caused with regard to the second charge which runs thus: "Secondly that you on or about the 25th day of May 1921 at Dasmari P.S. Paba and other places committed rape on Benodini." The story of the prosecution was that rape was committed on Benodini on a field at Dasmari by both the accused persons. Subsequently this woman was taken either by force or by fraud by Belat All alone to different places where he alone committed rape upon her. In this circumstance a joint charge against both the accused of having committed rape upon Benodini at Dasmari and in other places is improper. We are of opinion that such a charge is also embarrassing. It is urged on behalf of the Grown that although this is not a proper charge this has not in fact occasioned a failure of justice, because, if the evidence on behalf of the prosecution as to the first act of rape in the field at Dasmari was believed by the jury, both of the accused persons might be convicted of the offence. It is possible that this is so; but having regard to the other questions on which we consider this trial has been vitiated we think that in the subsequent trial this error in the charge should be set right. Although both of the accused persons might have been jointly charged with both the offences which were committed at Dasmari, if it is intended to prosecute Belat Ali with regard to the offences that he was accused of having committed elsewhere there should be separate charges with regard to those offences. While dealing with this matter we may also point out that in his charge to the jury with reference to the offence u/s 366, Indian Penal Code, the learned Judge has stated this: "You shall have to see (a) if the woman Benodini was by force compelled to leave her house and to go to the various places. In our opinion it is not necessary for the prosecution to establish that she was by force compelled to leave not only her house but compelled to go to various places in order to sustain the first charge on which the accused were tried.
3. The principal question on which we hold that the trial has been vitiated is of erroneous admission of evidence. The first is that evidence has been admitted as to what Benodini has stated to the investigating police officer and her pointing out the places where she was taken. The statement of another witness, that is, the mother-in-law of Benodini before the police has also been put in evidence. We should point outs that u/s 162, Criminal P.C., no statement or any record thereof whether in a police diary or otherwise or any part of such statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal P.C., is admissible as evidence except as provided in the second paragraph of that section. It was urged on behalf of the Crown that the statements that were put in evidence were not corroborative of the fact sworn to by the witnesses in the box, but were practically harmless and could not affect the decision as regards the main story of the offences. It is difficult for us to say how it worked on the minds of the jury, and