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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
RAJARSHI BHARADWAJ, UDAY KUMAR, JJ.
Shree Shyam Steel Co. – Appellant
Versus
Commissioner of Central Tax, CGST and Central Excise – Respondent
CEXA No. 60 of 2024, IA No. GA 2 of 2024
Decided On : 24-12-2025
Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, the key points are as follows:
The Court emphasized that the interpretation of 'sufficient cause' under the Limitation Act must be liberal, prioritizing justice over rigid procedural adherence (!) .
The delay in filing the appeal was primarily due to the Appellant’s bona fide efforts to resolve the dispute through a State-sponsored amnesty scheme, which the Court found to be a valid and justifiable reason for the delay (!) (!) .
The Court acknowledged the extraordinary circumstances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, which impacted the Appellant’s ability to monitor the public portal and respond within the usual time frames (!) (!) .
The Tribunal’s characterization of the delay as 'total negligence' was deemed overly technical and unjust, especially given the Appellant’s genuine attempt to settle the dispute and the circumstances of the delay (!) (!) .
The Court held that procedural rigidity should not result in the extinguishment of substantive rights, particularly when the delay was not deliberate or mala fide but rooted in bona fide efforts and external hardships (!) (!) .
The Court decided to condone the delay, imposing a nominal cost to balance the interests of justice and the inconvenience caused to the Revenue, and directed the restoration of the appeal for a full hearing on merits (!) (!) .
The appeal was allowed on the grounds that the delay was sufficiently justified, and the procedural approach of the Tribunal was deemed overly strict (!) .
The Court reaffirmed that the primary concern should be substantive justice, and procedural lapses should not automatically lead to the dismissal of rights, especially in cases involving genuine efforts to resolve disputes through statutory schemes (!) (!) .
The final order set aside the initial order dismissing the appeal, condoned the delay upon payment of costs, and directed the appeal to be restored for a hearing on its merits (!) .
These points collectively highlight the Court’s stance on balancing procedural rules with substantive justice, especially in complex cases involving external hardships and bona fide efforts.
JUDGMENT :
UDAY KUMAR, J.
1. This appeal, preferred by the Assessee under the statutory mandate of Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944, assails the legality of Interim Order No. 142/2024 (Defect) dated 14.05.2024, passed by the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Eastern Zonal Bench, Kolkata. By the said order, the learned Tribunal refused to condone a delay of 2262 days in filing the statutory appeal against the Order-in-Original, resulting in a summary dismissal of the Assessee’s plea upon the characterization of their inaction as "total negligence."
2. The timeline of the delay is bifurcated into two distinct phases. The statutory limitation for filing the appeal expired on 10.04.2018 however, the appeal was eventually preferred only on 28.03.2024 The Appellant sought to bridge this hiatus by pleading bona fide reliance upon the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019 (SVLDRS). An application under the said Scheme was filed on 18.12.2019, but the Appellant asserts that they remained oblivious to its rejection until late 2023.
3. The learned Tribunal dismissed the application on two primary grounds:
i. The period between the expiry of limitation (April 2018) and the filing of the SVLDRS application (December 2019) remained unaccounted for.
ii. The rejection status was available on a public web portal as of 20.01.2020; hence, the plea of ignorance was deemed unsustainable in the eyes of the law
4. Mr. N.K. Chowdhury, learned Counsel for the Appellant, assisted by Mr. Nolotpal Chowdhury and Mr. Prabir Bera, forcefully submitted that the Tribunal’s decision was founded upon an unduly technical and rigid interpretation. He emphasized that the delay was actuated by a bona fide, albeit perhaps misguided, attempt to avail a statutory amnesty. Pressing the jurisprudential standard set in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123, he urged that the expression "sufficient cause" must be liberally construed, as the acceptability of the explanation is the sole criterion, regardless of the length of the delay.
5. Conversely, Mr. Vipul Kundalia, the learned Senior Advocate/Authorized Representative for the respondent / Revenue, assisted by Mr. Anurag Roy and Mr. Dhirodatta Chaudhuri, sought to defend the impugned order, by stressing the gross negligence evident in the initial period of delay. He further argued that the failure to verify the publicly accessible online status for nearly four years evinced a profound lack of diligence, justifying the finding of "total negligence" under the rigors of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
6. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the materials on record, the Substantial Question of Law that arises for our consideration is:
"Whether the learned Tribunal was justified in adopting a hyper- technical approach by refusing to condone the delay, thereby extinguishing the Appellant’s right to challenge a significant financial penalty on merits, especially when the delay was attributed to the pursuit of a State-sponsored Amnesty Scheme?"
7. The factual matrix, while involving a staggering delay, is relatively straightforward. The statutory limitation for filing the appeal before the CESTAT expired on 10.04.2018. The appeal was eventually filed on 28.03.2024. The Appellant’s primary explanation for this hiatus is their participation in the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019 (SVLDRS). The Appellant contends that having applied for the scheme in December 2019, they were under a bona fide belief that the dispute would be settled. It was only in late 2023 that they allegedly realized their application had been rejected on the portal.
8. The learned Tribunal took a stern view, characterizing the conduct of the Appellant as "total negligence." The Tribunal held that the Appellant failed to explain the "initial lethargy" between April 2018 and the launch of the SVLDRS in 2019. Furthermore, it was observed that since the
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