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2025 Supreme(Jhk) 2306

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Tarlok Singh Chauhan, C.J.Rajesh Shankar, J.
ESH Ispat Private Limited - Petitioners
Versus
The Principal Commissioner, Central Goods and Service Tax & Central Excise, Central Revenue Building - Respondents
W.P. (T) No. 4444 of 2025
Decided On : 26-08-2025

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Petitioner:Mr. Abhay Prakash, Advocate
For the Respondent:Mr. P.A.S. Pati, Advocate, Mr. Shivam Singh, Advocate, Mr. Anurag Vijay, Advocate

Appellate authorities and courts lack jurisdiction to condone delays in filing statutory appeals beyond the maximum period prescribed by special legislation. Such statutes operate as self-contained codes, implicitly excluding the general application of the Limitation Act and rendering writ petitions seeking to override these specific bars non-maintainable.

Headnote:(A) Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - Section 107 - Limitation period for filing appeal - Statutory authority - Power to condone delay - Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution - Applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 - Appellate authorities are creatures of statute and possess no jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the statutory period prescribed - Writ courts cannot override explicit statutory bars on limitation where the statute provides a comprehensive mechanism for relief. (Paras 3, 4, 8)

(B) Writ jurisdiction - Scope and ambit - High Court’s power not to be exercised to circumvent mandatory limitation periods prescribed by special legislation - Tax statutes act as self-contained codes, effectively excluding the general application of the Limitation Act for filing appeals. (Paras 6, 7, 8)

Facts of the case:
The petitioner sought a direction for the appellate authority to accept a belated appeal filed after the expiration of the absolute statutory time limit. Alternatively, the petitioner challenged the merit of the original order and requested a stay on coercive recovery proceedings pending the resolution of the writ petition.

Findings of Court:
The court determined that the appellate authority lacks any power to condone a delay that exceeds the statutory grace period allowed by the legislation. Relying on established precedents, the court affirmed that tax acts function as self-contained codes, thereby precluding the use of general law to extend limitation periods. Judicial interference under constitutional powers is not appropriate to bypass explicit legislative mandates regarding the time frame for administrative appeals.

Issues: The main issues addressed were whether a writ court can condone a delay in filing a statutory appeal when the statute strictly limits the appellate authority’s power to do so, and whether the statutory limitation period effectively excludes the operation of general law on limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: Specific tax legislation provides a complete mechanism for appeal and fixes an absolute limitation period. Once this statutory period has lapsed, neither the appellate authority nor the court can condone the delay, as doing so would render the legislative intent of the special statute otiose.

Result: Writ petition dismissed.

Table of Content
1. nature of relief sought by the petitioner. (Para 1)
2. strict interpretation of time limits under section 107, cgst act. (Para 2 , 3)
3. high court's article 226 power cannot circumvent statutory limitation periods. (Para 4 , 5 , 6 , 7)
4. cgst act is a self-contained code excluding limitation act provisions. (Para 8 , 9)
5. final dismissal of the writ petition due to lack of maintainability. (Para 10)

JUDGMENT :

Tarlok Singh Chauhan, C.J. (Oral)

1. The instant writ petition has been filed for grant of the following substantive relief:-

“for directing the respondent no. 2. the Commissioner (Appeal) to accept the appeal which the petitioners now intend to file under section 107(1) of the Central Goods & Services Tax Act, 2017, against the order dated 13.01.2025 passed by the Additional Commissioner, CGST & CX Hqrs, Ranchi, as the same stands beyond the statutory limit as prescribed under section 107(1) of CGST Act, considering the extra-ordinary circumstances of the petitioners preventing him to file the appeal, by condoning the delay of about 2 months 10 days.

OR/In Alternative For quashing of the order dated 13.01.2025 passed by the respondent no. 3 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition), as the same has been passed without proper application of mind and without considering the entirety of the reply (undated) filed on behalf of the petitioners and duly received by the respondent office on 11.10.2023.

AND During the pendency of the present writ application, the respondents may be constrain from taking any coercive steps as against the petitioners for recovery of the alleged amount as determined vide order dated 13.01.2025.”

2. Clearly the relief as claimed for is totally misconceived for the reason that Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (in short ‘the Act’) stipulates the procedure for filing of appeal before the appellate authority which reads as under:

“107. Appeals to Appellate Authority:

(1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act or the State Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act by an adjudicating authority may Appeal to such Appellate Authority as may be prescribed within three months from the date on which the said decision or order is communicated to such person.

(2) …………………….. (3) ……………………..

(4) The Appellate Authority may, if he is satisfied that the Appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the Appeal within the aforesaid period of three months or six months, as the case may be, allow it to be presented within a further period of one month”

…………………………………………..”

3. A plain reading of Section 107 of the Act makes it absolutely clear that the appellate authority has no power to allow an appeal to be presented beyond the period of one month from the date of filing of such appeal.

4. How this provision is to be construed would be determined on the basis of somewhat similar provision contained in the Central Excise Act which came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “ Singh Enterprises Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur , (2008) 3 SCC 70. The Hon’ble Supreme Court therein was considering a case wherein the Commissioner had dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was time barred and filed beyond the period of 30 days from the expiry of the period of 60 days, as prescribed for filing of a statutory appeal. The High Court dismissed the writ petition and the matter reached before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and it was argued that the Commissioner has no power to condone the delay. However, the High Court could condone the delay by exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India since such power is untrammelled by the statutory provision. Negating the above contention, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 8 observed as under:-

“8. The Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) as also the Tribunal being creatures of statute are not vested with jurisdiction to condone the de

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