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2025 Supreme(Cal) 449

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT CALCUTTA
Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, Uday Kumar, JJ.
Bhagwati Developers Private Limited – Appellant
Versus
The Peerless General Finance and Investment Company Ltd. and others – Respondents
M.A.T 841 of 2013, IA No: CAN 1 of 2013 (Old No: CAN 5429 of 2013)
Decided On : 15-07-2025

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant : Mr. Ishan Saha, Mr. S. Rudra
For the Respondent: Mr. Abhrajit Mitra, Mr. Soumya Ray Chowdhury, Ms. I. Hassan, Mr. S. Sarawgi, Mr. Aman Agarwal, Mr. Himangshu, Mr. Tapan Nag Chowdhury

Litigants must demonstrate diligence in their appeals, as negligence or blame on counsel does not justify condonation of significant delays.

Headnote:(A) Limitation Act - Sections 3 and 5 - Condonation of delay - Application filed for condonation of a delay of 262 days in preferring the appeal due to the negligence of the Advocate - The court highlights that litigants cannot suffer for their counsel's laches and the approach to condone delay is discretionary - The merits of the appeal are not to be considered while deciding the condonation application. (Paras 7, 30, 47)

(B) Public Policy - The doctrine of public policy in the context of limitation laws dictates that there should be an end to litigation, emphasizing a fixed period for availing a remedy. (Paras 15, 16, 18)

(C) Judicial Vigilance - A litigant must demonstrate diligence in pursuing its case to receive equitable relief of condonation. (Paras 24, 49)

Facts of the case:
The appellant's petition for condonation of delay was denied due to inadequate explanation for the 262-day delay in filing an appeal stemming from a writ petition that was disposed of without the appellant's knowledge owing to the Advocate's negligence.

Findings of Court:
The court ruled that sufficient cause for the delay was not established, leading to dismissal of the condonation application as well as the main appeal.

Issues: The key issues addressed included the question of whether the delay was inordinate and whether the appellant showed due diligence in pursuing their rights.

Ratio Decidendi: The court noted that while discretion exists to condone delays, negligence of the litigant and Advocate cannot serve as a basis for leniency in the application of limitation laws.

Result: Applications dismissed.

Table of Content
1. request for condonation of delay with merits. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5)
2. discussion on knowledge regarding disposal. (Para 6 , 10 , 12 , 13)
3. arguments regarding the merits and rationale for denying condonation. (Para 7 , 8 , 9 , 11)
4. judicial discretion in condonation applications and public policy considerations. (Para 14)
5. importance of adherence to limitation laws. (Para 15 , 16 , 17 , 18)
6. critique of blame shifting from litigants to counsel. (Para 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , 24)
7. judicial views on litigants' negligence towards their proceedings. (Para 25 , 26)
8. conclusion on diligence and acceptance of blame. (Para 30 , 31 , 32 , 33 , 34)
9. final ruling on the credibility of the condonation application. (Para 36 , 37 , 39)

JUDGMENT :

1. The present application, bearing CAN 1 of 2013 (Old No: CAN 5429 of 2013), has been filed for condonation of the delay of about 262 days in preferring the instant appeal.

2. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/petitioner submits that there were no laches on the part of the petitioner in occasioning the delay in preferring the appeal.

3. By placing reliance on the averments made in the condonation application, it is pointed out that the writ petition, from which the present appeal arises, was being heard before the concerned learned Single Judge and was fixed ‘For Orders’ on July 16, 2012, on which date the erstwhile learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner had missed the matter in the list inadvertently and had not appeared at the hearing.

4. Subsequently, it is contended, when the matter was mentioned before the said learned Single Judge for being included in the list on May 3, 2013, the learned Single Judge was pleased to point out that the writ petition had already been disposed of on July 23, 2012.

5. It is contended that immediately thereafter, a certified copy was applied for in respect of the said judgment and upon obtaining the same, a change of Advocate was taken and the present appeal has been preferred.

6. As such, since there was no contemporaneous knowledge on the part of the appellant regarding the disposal of the writ petition, no steps were previously taken before May 3, 2013.

7. It is further argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that it is a well-settled principle of law that the litigants cannot suffer for the laches of their counsel.

8. Moreover, it is argued that in cases of condonation of delay, particularly since the period of delay is not so long, a lenient approach ought to be taken by courts.

9. Learned counsel also submits that the appeal, otherwise, has merits and ought not to be discarded at the threshold on the ground of limitation.

10. Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents vehemently opposes the prayer for condonation and by placing reliance on the supplementary affidavit filed to the affidavit-in- opposition by the respondents to the condonation application, points out that the averment as to the matter being mentioned before the concerned learned Single Judge on May 3, 2013 is a charade.

11. It is submitted that since there was no subsisting interim order being suffered by the respondents, there could not have arisen any occasion for the respondent to so mention the matter.

12. Furthermore, learned senior counsel places reliance on paragraph no.12 of the supplementary affidavit of the respondents to show that a supplementary affidavit, mentioning about the disposal of the writ petition, had been affirmed on May 2, 2013 in connection with a different matter, being APO 346 of 1996 with APO 347 of 1996, a copy of which was served on the present appellant.

13. Thus, the appellant had full knowledge of the disposal of the writ petition on such date independently of any mentioning.

14. Thus, it is submitted that the equitable relief of condonation of delay ought to be refused in view of the attempt on the part of the petitioner to mislead the court by stating that it derived knowledge of the disposal of the writ petition for

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